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I. Introduction
A new tax break may drive as much as $100 billion in
investments to impoverished neighborhoods over the next ten
years.1 The tax break, which was buried within the Tax Cuts and
Jobs Act of 2017,2 provides tax relief to individuals and businesses
that make indirect investments in low-income communities
designated as “Opportunity Zones.”3 Notwithstanding the
undeniable enthusiasm among many investors and members of the
development community,4 industry watchers and anti-poverty
1. Jon Banister, Investors Lining Up to Pour Billions into Opportunity
Zones, BISNOW (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.bisnow.com/national/news/economicdevelopment/investors-lining-up-to-pour-money-into-opportunity-zones-93572
(explaining the national interest in the new Opportunity Zone investment areas)
(on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice);
Richard Rubin, New ‘Opportunity Zone’ Tax-Break Rules Offer Flexibility to
Developers, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/newopportunity-zone-tax-break-rules-offer-flexibility-to-developers-1539948600
(explaining the Trump Administration’s business-friendly clarification on
Opportunity Zone rules and regulations) (on file with the Washington & Lee
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
2. See Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (Dec. 22, 2017) (“An Act To provide
for reconciliation pursuant to titles II and V of the concurrent resolution on the
budget for fiscal year 2018.”).
3. See I.R.C. § 1400Z-1 (2018) (defining a qualified opportunity zone).
Under the new tax law, taxpayers who sell appreciated property can defer or,
sometimes, exempt taxes they would otherwise owe on capital gains by
reinvesting sale proceeds in so-called “Opportunity Funds.” See id. In turn,
Opportunity Funds are required to make new equity investments in businesses
located in designated Opportunity Zones. Id.
4. See Dane Stangler, Turning Opportunity Zones into Real Opportunities
with
Launch
Pad,
FORBES
(Feb.
6,
2019,
12:36
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/danestangler/2019/02/06/turning-opportunityzones-into-real-opportunities-with-launch-pad/#793d49b73bfe
(emphasizing
potential utilization of opportunity zones to develop place-based policy) (on file
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advocates continue to debate whether Opportunity Zones hold
promise as a solution to impoverished communities.5
This debate is not new.6 Tax incentives used to drive
investment to low-income areas, which this Article refers to as
“place-based investment tax incentives,” have been controversial
since they first appeared in 1980s.7 Yet, despite a considerable
amount of empirical research,8 their impact on poor communities
with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
5. See, e.g., Edmund Andrews, Will “Opportunity Zones” Lift Neighborhoods
Out
of
Poverty,
INSIGHTS
BY
STAN.
BUS.
(June
1,
2018),
https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/insights/will-opportunity-zones-lift-neighborhoodsout-poverty (analyzing how incentives may work and mapping the demographic
and economic characteristics of tracts now being designated as Opportunity
Zones) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social
Justice).
6. See Noah Buhayar, Will ‘Opportunity Zones’ Help the Rich, the Poor or
Both?,
WASH. POST: BLOOMBERG QUICK TAKE
(Jan.
4,
2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/will-opportunity-zoneshelp-the-richthe-poor-or-both/2019/01/04/2a1e153a-0fe1-11e9-8f0c6f878a26288a_story.html?utm_term=.1c41dcf6a93d (comparing Opportunity
Zones with the previous Empowerment Zones) (on file with the Washington & Lee
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
7. See, e.g., Noah Buhayar, For Goldman, a Tax Break Makes Helping Poor
More Lucrative, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 29, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2018-08-29/goldman-sachs-leads-race-for-tax-break-helping-poorcommunities (“Opportunity funds are both innovative and controversial. They
have to focus their investments in roughly 8,700 low-income communities selected
by state governors and other officials. Zones range from gritty urban
neighborhoods to shrinking Rust Belt towns.”) (on file with the Washington & Lee
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
8. See, e.g., Deirdre Oakley & Hui-Shien Tsao, A New Way of Revitalizing
Distressed Urban Communities? Assessing the Impact of the Federal
Empowerment Zone Program, 28 J. URB. AFF. 443, 443–71 (2006); ROBERT
RHERMANN, ET AL., EVALUATION OF THE ENTERPRISE ZONE TAX CREDIT (2014),
http://dls.maryland.gov/pubs/prod/TaxFiscalPlan/WEB- Evaluation- of- t
he- Enterprise-Zone-Tax-Credit.pdf (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of
Civil Rights& Social Justice); DAVID STOKES, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ENTERPRISE
ZONES IN MISSOURI 20 (2013) https://showmeinstitute.org/sites/default/
files/14_EnterpriseZ ones_Singles_0.pdf (on file with the Washington & Lee
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice); Matthew Freedman, Targeted Business
Incentives and Local Labor Markets, 48 J. HUM. RESOURCES 311, 311–44 (2013);
Devon Lynch & Jeffrey S. Zax, Incidence and Substitution in Enterprise Zone
Programs: The Case of Colorado, 39 PUBLIC FINANCE REV. 226–55 (2011); Jed
Kolko & David Neumark, Do Some Enterprise Zones Create Jobs?, 29 J. POL’Y
ANALYSIS MGMT. 5–38 (2010); Joel A. Elvery, The Impact of Enterprise Zones on
Resident Employment: An Evaluation of the Enterprise Zone Programs of
California and Florida, 23 ECON. DEV. Q. 44–59 (2009); Stephen Billings, Do
Enterprise Zones Work?: An Analysis at the Borders, 37 PUB. FIN. REV. 68, 68–93
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remains unclear. This Article analyzes the current legal landscape
of place-based investment tax incentives, and it develops a
typology to aid tax researchers, poverty law researchers, social
scientists, and policymakers as they work to understand the limits
and potential of tax law as a tool to fight neighborhood poverty.
Among the most pessimistic views of place-based investment
tax incentives is that such laws are mere giveaways to businesses
and their high-income shareholders.9 From this perspective, not
only do such laws undermine progressivity in the tax system while
utterly failing to benefit poor communities, but they also reinforce
structural inequality in ways that actively harm the poor.10 Indeed,
many studies cast doubt on whether place-based investment tax

(2009); Daniele Bondonio & Robert T. Greenbaum, Do Local Tax Incentives Affect
Economic Growth? What Mean Impacts Miss in The Analysis of Enterprise Zone
Policies, 37 REG. SCI. URBAN ECON. 121, 121–36 (2007); Robert T. Greenbaum &
John B. Engberg, The Impact of State Enterprise Zones on Urban Manufacturing
Establishments, 23 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 315, 315–39 (2004); JOEL A.
ELVERY, THE IMPACT OF ENTERPRISE ZONES ON RESIDENT EMPLOYMENT: AN
EVALUATION OF THE ENTERPRISE ZONE PROGRAMS OF CALIFORNIA AND FLORIDA
(2004), http://drum.lib.umd.edu/handle/1903/1793 (on file with the Washington &
Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice); Karen Mossberger, State-Federal
Diffusion and Policy Learning: From Enterprise Zones to Empowerment Zones, 29
PUBLIUS: J. FED. 31, 31–50 (1999); Margaret G. Wilder & Barry M. Rubin, Rhetoric
Versus Reality: A Review of Studies on State Enterprise Zone Programs, 62 J. AM.
PLAN. ASSOC. 473, 473–91 (1996); Audrey G. McFarlane, Empowerment Zones:
Urban Revitalization Through Collaborative Enterprise, 5 J. AFFORDABLE
HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 35, 35–54 (1995); Dina Schlossberg, The
Empowerment Zones/Enterprise Communities: New Cure for Distressed Urban
Communities or the Same Old Band-Aid, 2 HYBRID 33, 33– 42 (1994); Elizabeth
M. Gunn, The Growth of Enterprise Zones: A Policy Transformation, 21 POL’Y
STUD. J. 432, 432–49 (1993); Wayne E. Ruhter, Enterprise Zones: Some Empirical
Observations Symposium on the New Federalism and Urban Opportunities:
Comment, 2 CATO J. 407, 407–10 (1982).
9. See Steven M. Rosenthal, Opportunity Zones May Create More
Opportunities for Investors and Syndicators Than Distressed Communities Tax
Policy Center, TAX POL’Y CTR. (Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.taxpolicy
center.org/taxvox/opportunity-zones-may-create-more-opportunities-investorsand-syndicators-distressed (raising the alarm on the lack of government oversight
with Opportunity Zones) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil
Rights & Social Justice).
10. Id.
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incentives help create jobs,11 reduce unemployment,12 or reduce
poverty levels.13 Others provide strong evidence that a significant
portion of tax-subsidy value is often captured by private market
investors, syndicators, and developers rather than flowing into
poor communities.14 Still others suggest that some place-based
investment tax incentives contribute to gentrification and
displacement.15
11. See, e.g., Daniele Bondonio & Robert T. Greenbaum, Do Local Tax
Incentives Affect Economic Growth? What Mean Impacts Miss in the Analysis of
Enterprise Zone Policies, 37 REG. SCI. & URB. ECON. 121, 133 (2007) (“The results
indicate that positive zone-induced increases in employment, sales, and capital
expenditures in new and existing establishments are offset by zone-induced losses
among firms that close or leave the zone area.”); Jed Kolko & David Neumark, Do
Some Enterprise Zones Create Jobs?, 29 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 5, 20 (2010)
(“In light of the fact that the average effect of enterprise zones is near zero,
evidence of variation in the effects of enterprise zones could suggest that some
enterprise zones increase employment, while others decrease it.”).
12. See, e.g., Andrew Hanson, Local Employment, Poverty, and Property
Value Effects of Geographically-Targeted Tax Incentives: An Instrumental
Variables Approach, 39 REG. SCI. URB. ECON. 721, 730 (2009) (showing that
property values may be impacted more than unemployment); Joel A. Elvery, The
Impact of Enterprise Zones on Resident Employment: An Evaluation of the
Enterprise Zone Programs of California and Florida, 23 ECON. DEV. Q. 44, 57
(2009) (detailing the problems with estimating the impact of enterprise zone
programs).
13. See Douglas J. Krupka & Douglas S. Noonan, Empowerment Zones,
Neighborhood Change and Owner-Occupied Housing, 39 REG. SCI. URB. ECON.
386, 394 (2009) (examining the direct price effects on neighborhood price levels,
including housing stock).
14. See Gregory S. Burge, Do Tenants Capture the Benefits from the
Low- Income Housing Tax Credit Program?, 39 REAL EST. ECON. 71, 72 (2011)
(finding that tenants capture less than half of the credit benefits in the form of
rental savings and that such savings are highest in the early years of a projects'
occupancy); Michael Eickhoff & Steve Carter, Accessing Capital Through the New
Markets Tax Credit Program, 29 J. ST. TAX. RIVERWOODS 17 (2011) (explaining
that the NMTC is typically transferred to a third-party investor at a discount
ranging between $0.68 and $0.74 per dollar of credit in exchange for capital
infusion into the project); Mihir A. Desai, Dhammika Dharmapala & Monica
Singhal, Tax Incentives for Affordable Housing: The Low Income Housing Tax
Credit, 24 TAX POL’Y ECON. 181, 185 (2010) (explaining that LIHTC investors
"purchase" credits a discount and that syndication costs may consume 10–27% of
equity invested in LIHTC projects).
15. See, e.g., Matthew Freedman, Teaching New Markets Old Tricks: The
Effects of Subsidized Investment on Low-Income Neighborhoods, 96 J. PUB. ECON.
1000, 1013 (2012) (finding that the NMTC has some positive effects on
neighborhood conditions in low-income communities but observing that the
observed impacts are attributable to changes in the composition of residents as
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But not all of the empirical studies have such dire conclusions.
Some have found positive impacts on communities, including lower
poverty rates,16 increased employment17 and higher home values.18
Though such studies are in the minority and tend to focus on
economic indicators (as opposed to factors like health, crime, or
education that also impact communities),19 they nevertheless
provide some hope that place-based investment tax incentives
could lead to positive outcomes for poor communities if
appropriately designed. Meanwhile, policymakers have long
presented place-based investment tax incentives to the public as
anti-poverty programs,20 and some recent legal scholarship has
categorized place-based investment tax incentives as a subset of
anti-poverty tax laws.21
Setting aside the question of whether current place-based
investment tax incentives are intended as or designed to be
anti-poverty laws,22 it is essential to understand their impact on
poor communities. To do so, we must move beyond mere debates
opposed to improvements in the welfare of existing residents).
16. See Hanson, supra note 12, at 730 (“[I]t may be more likely that
geographically-targeted tax incentives and grants benefit land owners, therefore
caution should be used when crafting policy that is tied to location if the intended
effect is to improve labor market outcomes for residents.”).
17. See, e.g., Freedman, supra note 15, at 1000 (“Poverty and unemployment
rates fall by statistically significant amounts in tracts that receive
NMTC- subsidized investment relative to similar tracts that do not.”).
18. See Krupka & Noonan, supra note 13, at 394. (“We find these results
striking in light of the goals and rationale of the policy. Empowerment Zones were
not billed as property value enhancement programs.”).
19. See, e.g., Freedman, supra note 15, at 1002–03 (utilizing an
“econometric” approach to analyze the effect of tax-based incentives).
20. See Ellen P. Aprill, Caution: Enterprise Zones Los Angeles, 66 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1341, 1341–42 (1992) (describing President Bush’s effort to use enterprise
zones to reduce poverty).
21. See Susannah Camic Tahk, The Tax War on Poverty, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 791,
810–15 (2014) (categorizing place-based investment incentives in exactly that
way).
22. In a companion article, I have argued that most place-based investment
tax incentives have their origins in pro-gentrification policies and are designed to
subsidize businesses, but that the strongest justifications for such laws rest on
pro-social grounds. As such, place-based investment tax incentives should be
redesigned to better advance anti-poverty goals. This can be accomplished by
prioritizing poor communities over other beneficiaries of the tax laws. See
Michelle D. Layser, The Pro-Gentrification Origins of Place-Based Investment Tax
Incentives, WIS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019).
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over the merits of place-based investment tax incentives and find
a way to navigate the morass of contradictory empirical findings
about these tax laws. To help fill this need, this Article develops a
typology of place-based investment tax incentives that can be used
to evaluate the relevance of empirical findings, identify new areas
of research, and predict the impact of specific tax incentive designs.
This Article makes several contributions to tax, poverty, and
empirical legal literature. First, it defines the category of
place-based investment tax incentives and identifies key elements
of variation across the category. Despite their prevalence at all
levels of government, place-based investment tax incentives
remain undertheorized and largely undefined in the literature.
The typology presented here reflects an analysis of three federal
tax incentives (the New Markets Tax Credit,23 the Low-Income
Housing Tax Credit,24 and the new Opportunity Zones law25) and
a detailed survey of tax incentives included in state enterprise zone
laws.26 By defining this category of tax laws and identifying the
basic types of place-based investment tax incentives that exist—or
may not yet exist—under current law, this Article helps situate the
conversation about these tax laws within broader tax policy
debates.
Second, the typology presented here can be used by both tax
and poverty law researchers to help assess the applicability of
23. I.R.C. § 45D (2018); see New Markets Tax Credit Program, U.S. DEP’T OF
TREASURY, https://www.cdfifund.gov/programs-training/Programs/new-marketstax-credit/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 4, 2019) (explaining the incentives
of using the NMTC program to attract private investment to distressed
communities) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social
Justice).
24. I.R.C. § 42 (2018); see Low-Income Housing Tax Credits, OFF. OF HOUSING
& URB. DEV., OFF. OF POL’Y DEV. & RES., https://www.huduser.gov/portal/datasets/
lihtc.html. (last visited Apr. 4, 2019) (identifying the most important resource for
creating affordable housing in the United States) (on file with the Washington &
Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
25. I.R.C. § 1400Z-1 (2018); see Opportunity Zones Frequently Asked
Questions,
INTERNAL
REVENUE
SERV.
(Jan.
11,
2019),
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/opportunity-zones-frequently-asked-questions.
(providing a list of common questions about Opportunity Zones) (on file with the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
26. Michelle D. Layser, How Do Place-Based Investment Tax Incentives
Target Low-Income Communities? A Multi-State Survey of Enterprise Zone Tax
Incentives,
Working
Paper
(May
1,
2019),
available
at
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=3381243.
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existing empirical studies to specific types of place-based
investment tax incentives. Social scientists have published dozens
of impact studies focusing on a wide variety of place-based
investment tax incentives.27 Those studies, which have focused on
both state and federal tax laws and their impact throughout the
country, have sometimes reached contradictory conclusions.28 The
ability of legal researchers to advance the debate over place-based
investment tax incentives—and to predict the impact of new laws
like Opportunity Zones—depends upon making sense of these
studies.
Third, this Article identifies areas for further legal and
empirical research. As will be explained, community-oriented
types of place-based investment tax incentives, which contain
features specifically designed to benefit residents of poor
communities, are uncommon under existing law. These rare types
of tax incentives are theoretically promising and enjoy some
empirical support;29 nevertheless, due in part to their rarity, they
have been largely understudied. The most complete understanding
of place-based investment tax incentives, therefore, will require
additional research about the ideal design and impact of
community-oriented investment tax incentives.
Accordingly, this Article proceeds as follows. Part II
introduces a two-dimensional typology to describe the category of
place-based investment tax incentives. Part II.A. presents the first
dimension, which asks whether the tax laws subsidize businesses
directly or indirectly through subsidized financing. Part II.B.
presents the second dimension, which asks whether the tax law
prioritizes improved profitability within a space, or whether it
prioritizes improved neighborhood conditions for the benefit of the
community that lives in that space. Part III applies the typology to
identify four distinct types of place-based investment tax
incentives and revisits existing empirical literature with respect to
each type in order to identify gaps in the literature and areas for
future research. Part IV concludes with final observations about
27. See supra note 8.
28. See infra Part III (identifying four distinct types of place-based
investment tax incentives as well as revisiting existing empirical literature with
respect to each type in order to identify gaps in the literature and areas for future
research).
29. See Layser, supra note 22, at 61–64; see also infra Part III.

A TYPOLOGY OF PLACE-BASED INVESTMENT TAX INCENTIVES 411
how this typology can be applied and used by future researchers
and policymakers.
II. The Typology
This Part presents a two-dimensional typology to describe
place-based investment tax incentives.30 The goal of the typology
is twofold. First, it aims to disaggregate key elements of variation
in the concept of place-based investment tax incentives so that the
design choices—and the limitations associated with those
choices—will be more salient to legal researchers and lawmakers.
Second, it seeks to provide a conceptual framework to help assess
the relevance of empirical studies to different types of tax
incentives. Identifying what we know, and what we do not know,
about place-based investment tax incentives is the first step
toward understanding their potential as anti-poverty tools.
Place-based investment tax incentives are distinguishable by
characteristics along two dimensions. As explained below, the first
dimension draws from tax expenditure theory to consider the
mechanism by which the tax incentives subsidize investments.31 It
asks whether the tax incentives deliver tax subsidies directly to
businesses that invest in low-income communities, or whether they
deliver tax subsidies to those businesses indirectly via tax benefits
claimed by third-party investors.32 Accordingly, the first dimension

30. Significantly, the typology presented here is “based on the notion of an
ideal type, a mental construct that deliberately accentuates certain
characteristics and not necessarily something that is found in empirical reality.”
See Kevin B. Smith, Typologies, Taxonomies, and the Benefits of Policy
Classification, 30 POL’Y STUD. J. 379, 380–81 (2002) (clarifying the advantages
that a taxonomic approach to policy classification may above and beyond
traditional typologies). Throughout the analysis, this Article will refer to current
tax law as illustrative examples; nevertheless, this typology seeks to reach beyond
existing law in order to help imagine alternative types of incentives that are rare
or absent within existing federal and state tax systems.
31. See infra notes 34–35 and accompanying text.
32. See Tahk, supra note 21, at 810–15 (offering commentary on the efficacy
on poverty of various forms of tax credits). Note that to the extent that they
ultimately confer benefit to poor communities, any place-based investment tax
incentives (direct or indirect) can be understood as indirect subsidies to the poor.
Id.
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divides place-based investment tax incentives into direct tax
subsidies and indirect tax subsidies.
The second dimension draws from geographic theories about
space and place to consider the mechanism by which the tax
incentives target investments to low-income areas. It asks whether
tax incentives target low-income areas by emphasizing economic
and physical conditions within spatial boundaries, or by
emphasizing how community members experience those
conditions.33 In this way, the second-dimension divides place-based
investment tax incentives into spatially-oriented investment tax
incentives and community oriented investment tax incentives.
Together, this two-by-two typology yields four possible
combinations of place-based investment tax incentives: Both direct
and indirect forms of spatially-oriented investment tax incentives,
and both direct and indirect forms of community-oriented
investment tax incentives. The remainder of this Part will
elaborate upon the two dimensions of the typology and will identify
issues presented by each dimension that may have bearing on their
capacity for use as anti-poverty tools.
A. The First Dimension: Direct vs. Indirect Tax Subsidies
Tax expenditure theory emphasizes the economic equivalence
of tax preferences and direct expenditures.34 Under the theory, all
investment tax incentives can be understood as “tax subsidies”
used to promote investment.35 Accordingly, the first dimension of
the typology focuses on the way that the tax incentives subsidize
investment. To understand the distinction between direct and
indirect tax subsidies, however, it is helpful to understand the
concept of tax incidence.

33. See infra note 134 and accompanying text (examining the history of
federal investment in urban neighborhoods that leaves unresolved the benefits
for people of color).
34. See Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing
Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83
HARV. L. REV. 705, 706, 711 (1970) (arguing that tax incentives are generally
inferior to direct subsidies as a means of achieving social goals).
35. Id.
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Tax incidence describes the person or persons who bear the
burden of a tax or enjoy the benefit of a tax preference.36 The
actual, economic incidence of a tax law may be distinct from its
technical incidence.37 In other words, the taxpayer who claims a
tax preference on a tax return may not be the sole beneficiary of
its value.38 For example, a subsidy theory is used to explain the
function of charitable donations deductions.39 That theory assumes
that the deduction subsidizes charities, not the taxpayers who
claim the deduction.40 In other words, charities receive an indirect
tax subsidy when donors increase the size of their charitable
contributions in response to the deduction.

36. See Linda Sugin, Tax Expenditures, Reform, and Distributive Justice, 3
COLUM. J. TAX L. 1, 7 (2011) (arguing that the elimination of tax expenditures is
a flawed approach to tax reform).
37. Technical incidence refers to the taxpayer who claims the tax preference,
and the specific activity that gives rise to the tax preference. For example, as
explained below, a taxpayer may claim a tax credit for investing in a Community
Development Entity. The technical incidence falls on that taxpayer claimant on
the CDE investment. Nevertheless, if the tax preference ultimately helps increase
the amount of money that the CDE invests in low-income businesses, then the
economic incidence may inure to the low-income business.
38. See Sugin, supra note 36 (arguing that the elimination of tax
expenditures is a flawed approach to tax reform).
39. See generally Miranda Perry Fleischer, Theorizing the Charitable Tax
Subsidies: The Role of Distributive Justice, 87 WASH. UNIV. L. REV. 505 (2010)
(arguing the need to explicitly address distributive justice to enhance
understanding of tax subsidies).
40. See Sugin, supra note 36 (arguing that the elimination of tax
expenditures is a flawed approach to tax reform).
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Here, a justification for place-based investment tax incentives
is to subsidize businesses that invest in low-income communities.41
This tax subsidy may be delivered directly to such businesses in
the form of tax credits or deductions.42 Nevertheless, as this
Section will explain, the tax subsidy may also be delivered to those
businesses indirectly by providing tax credits or deductions to
investors who increase the amount that they invest in such
businesses. The figure below displays the distinction between
direct and indirect tax subsidies.

Stated somewhat differently, the goal of any investment tax
incentive is to motivate taxpayers to make a financial or business
investment.43 But a choice must be made as to whether to use tax
incentives to subsidize financing, or to use tax incentives to
influence businesses’ decisions about how to put their capital to
work through labor or capital investment. Depending on how this
choice is resolved, the tax incentives may target radically different
types of claimants, give rise to different types of tax-motivated
41. See Fleischer, supra note 39, at 517–18 (arguing the need to explicitly
address distributive justice to enhance understanding of tax subsidies).
42. Surrey, supra note 34, at 711 (arguing that tax incentives are generally
inferior to direct subsidies as a means of achieving social goals despite economic
equivalence).
43. See id. (noting the goals of investment taxes).
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transactions, and present a range of unique but predictable
challenges.
As a result, the choice between direct and indirect tax
subsidies can have important implications for the effectiveness of
the tax incentives as anti-poverty tools. This Section will elaborate
on this division of place-based investment tax incentives—those
targeting businesses and those targeting third-party investors. In
addition, it will explain how the choice between direct and indirect
tax subsidies affects the types of claimants and transactions
motivated by the tax incentives.
1. Direct Tax Subsidies
Direct tax subsidies provide tax breaks directly to businesses
that invest in low-income communities.44 A defining feature of tax
incentives within this dimension is that they are claimed directly
by eligible businesses to subsidize costs associated with starting,
expanding, or operating a business.45 Stated simply, direct tax
subsidies make it cheaper for eligible taxpayers to do business.46
With this basic definition in mind, this Section identifies two
characteristics of direct tax incentives that have bearing on their
impact.
First, the direct form confers a significant amount of power to
lawmakers to determine which businesses should be eligible for
the tax preferences.47 This is because direct tax incentives are
available to any business defined by lawmakers as eligible.48 These
businesses often do not compete with other businesses for the tax
subsidies; as long as they satisfy the statutory criteria, they can

44. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-90-105.1 (2016) (providing an example of
direct tax subsidies).
45. See id. (providing tax breaks for starting, expanding, or operating a
business).
46. This goal is distinct from the other major category of place-based
investment tax incentives, which are designed to increase the amount of low-cost
financing available to these businesses.
47. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1397C (2018) (defining “qualified business entities” for
the purposes of this section).
48. See id. (providing a tax break for business that meet the statutory
requirements of a “qualified business entity”).
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claim the tax benefits.49 For example, many state enterprise zone
programs provide direct tax subsidies that are more valuable to
capital-heavy businesses like manufacturers and producers than
labor-heavy businesses like retail.50 In fact, some states
specifically exclude common labor-heavy businesses from
eligibility.51 Because capital-intensive businesses may create fewer
jobs than labor-intensive businesses,52 the type of businesses that
respond to the tax incentives can profoundly affect their impact. If
job creation is an important objective of the tax law, then a direct
tax incentive that broadly targets capital-intensive businesses is
likely to fail.
Second, direct tax subsidies are heavily reliant on businesses’
actual, current tax exposure. Direct tax subsidies may take the
form of tax credits or tax deductions,53 but in either instance, their
49. See id. (allowing any qualified business entity to gain tax benefits).
50. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 39-30-105.1(6)(b), (f) (noting that
eligible taxpayers include manufacturers, producers, storage facilities, certain
agricultural businesses). The federal Empowerment Zones laws and most state
enterprise zone laws described above follow this model: Eligibility for the tax
incentives usually requires the taxpayer to be located in the zone. See, e.g., I.R.C.
§ 1397C (2018); ALA. CODE § 41-23-24 (2019) (dictating the process of selecting
enterprise zones in Alabama); CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 17053.73(b)(11)(A) (West
2019) (defining “qualified taxpayer” for purposes of the credit as an entity that is
engaged in a trade or business within a designated census tract or economic
development area); COL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-30-105.1(1)(a)(I) (West 2019)
(allowing a tax credit for any taxpayer who establishes a new business facility in
an enterprise zone); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-217(e) (West 2019) (allowing a
tax credit for any manufacturing facility located in an enterprise zone); R.I. Gen.
Laws § 42-64.3-7 (West 2019) (defining corporation for purposes of the section);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-28-203(4) (West 2019) (defining qualified businesses for
purposes of the tax benefit); UTAH CODE ANN. 1953 § 63N-2-212 (West 2019)
(defining business entities that qualify for the tax incentive); WIS. STAT. ANN.
238.399(5)(a-c) (West 2019) (defining airport development zones that can qualify
for tax credits). Tying taxpayer eligibility to a specific location creates an
incentive for some existing businesses to relocate to that area. See April, supra
note 20, at 1348; see also infra Appendix A (showing that 11/33 state enterprise
zone laws include tax incentives that promote investment in manufacturing or
production activities).
51. See, e.g., CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 17053.73(b)(11)(C) (2019) (excluding
retail trade businesses and food services businesses, among others).
52. AMANDA ROSS & KAITLYN WOLF, DO MARKET-BASED TAX INCENTIVES
ATTRACT NEW BUSINESSES? EVIDENCE FROM THE NEW MARKETS TAX CREDIT 18
(June 25, 2014), https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/124360/1/ERSA
2014_00653.pdf (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights &
Social Justice).
53. See Policy Basics: Tax Exemptions, Deductions, and Credits, CTR. ON
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value derives from decreasing a business’s tax liability.54 For
example, tax credits may be available to businesses that expand in
a particular area.55 Tax credits enable a taxpayer to offset the
amount of tax it would otherwise owe on a dollar-for-dollar basis.56
Nevertheless, unless the tax credit is refundable, the taxpayer
cannot use the tax credit unless it has actual tax liability to offset.57
Because many new businesses have little current tax liability, they
would be unable to use the tax credits.58
Even if a business does have current tax liability, the value
received from tax savings would not necessarily enable it to make
capital-intensive investments, such as large projects or new
construction.59 This is because the tax subsidy represents only a
percentage of the business’s actual investment (e.g., a refund of
50% of dollars spent on an employee’s salary or a capital
investment), and it does not provide the subsidized capital needed
to finance those investments.60 If a business needs capital for its
project, then the project may remain unfunded, and the eligible
investment may not be made. As a result, the direct form may not
be appropriate if the goal is to encourage new business startups or
other capital-intensive projects.
2. Indirect Tax Subsidies
In contrast, indirect tax subsidies target third-party investors
as claimants, with the ultimate goal of subsidizing businesses that
BUDGET
&
POL’Y
PRIORITIES
(Apr.
10,
2018),
https://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-tax/policy-basics-tax-exemptionsdeductions-and-credits (explaining tax credits and deductions) (on file with the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
54. See id. (describing the value of direct tax subsidies).
55. See id. (noting that some credits incentives business to expand).
56. See id. (explaining the mechanics of a tax credit).
57. See Michelle D. Layser, Improving Tax Incentives for Wind Energy
Production: The Case for a Refundable Production Tax Credit, 81 MO. L. REV. 453,
453 (2016) (arguing that the production tax credit should be a refundable credit).
58. See id. (explaining that many tax credits can be carried forward for use
in later years when the taxpayer has tax liability; nevertheless, the value of the
tax credit erodes with time, and the uncertainty of future income may make the
incentives less powerful).
59. See Layser, supra note 22.
60. See id.
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engage with low-income communities. Unlike direct tax subsidies,
which create incentives for businesses to perform certain activities
in low-income areas (e.g., starting or expanding a business, or
hiring certain employees),61 indirect tax subsidies create incentives
for investors to make capital contributions (debt or equity) in those
businesses.62 By subsidizing the investments, these tax laws
decrease the cost of capital for businesses that engage with lowincome communities, and generally increase the availability of
financing.63 In this way, the tax laws deliver indirect tax subsidies
to these businesses in the form of subsidized capital.
Indirect tax subsidies are distinct from their direct
counterparts in at least two ways that can affect their impact.
First, unlike direct tax incentives that give lawmakers the sole
power to determine what kinds of businesses will be subsidized,
indirect tax incentives transfer some of that power to the private
market.64 At a minimum, investors are free to choose among the
field of eligible projects in order to decide which projects to fund.65
This allows investors to contribute to the selection process, and it
allows the private market to help identify high-value projects.
Lawmakers could narrowly define the category of underlying
businesses that are eligible to receive the tax subsidized capital,
thereby constraining investors’ choices.66 But as a practical matter,
such laws are often written broadly to ensure a large field of
eligible businesses, thereby ensuring that the private market has
significant discretion to choose which projects to finance.67
Nevertheless, investors’ preferences may not always match the
objectives of lawmakers. To the extent that a particular type of

61. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-90-105.1 (2019) (providing an example of
direct tax subsidies).
62. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 45D (2018) (providing the new markets tax credit to
applicable taxpayers).
63. See, e.g., id. (providing the new markets tax credit to applicable
taxpayers).
64. See, e.g., id. (allowing the credit for qualified equity investments and
investment in qualified community investment entities).
65. See, e.g., id. (same).
66. See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing indirect community-oriented
investment tax incentives).
67. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 45D (2018) (allowing the new markets tax credit for
eligible taxpayers).
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investment is desired, it would make sense for lawmakers to draft
narrow definitions of eligible projects.
Second, unlike direct tax subsidies, which do not subsidize
capital and are generally unable to support projects with
significant financing needs,68 indirect tax subsidies do have this
capacity. In fact, indirect tax subsidies help address a significant
challenge faced by affordable housing and community
development: The inability of developers to attract sufficient
equity financing to satisfy creditors’ required debt-equity ratios.69
CDEs and affordable housing developers rely on tax credit
monetization transactions to convert tax credit value into
financing,70 enabling them to finance their projects (or invest in
low-income communities) with public money.
While some state tax laws provide tax credits to investors that
contribute directly to eligible entities in tax favored zones,71
current law also contains two significant variations of indirect tax
subsidies. Both of these variations are capable of financing large,
68. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-90-105.1 (2019).
69. See Telephone Interview with Anonymous Source No. 2 (May 11, 2017)
(on file with the author); see also COHN REZNICK LLP, THE LOW-INCOME HOUSING
TAX CREDIT PROGRAM AT YEAR 25: AN EXPANDED LOOK AT ITS PERFORMANCE (2012),
https://www.cohnreznick.com/sites/default/files/2012lihtc/cohnreznick-lihtc2012-fullreport.pdf (describing net tax credit equity) (on file with the Washington
& Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). Without subsidies, investors are
unwilling to make equity investments in affordable housing or community
development projects because the expected rate of return is too low—and creditors
are unwilling to lend to projects without sufficient equity. Id. The LIHTC and
NMTC exist to provide this subsidy and to encourage and enable equity
investments in projects that serve low-income communities.
70. In monetization transactions, investors make equity contributions in
exchange for the ability to claim the tax credits as they are earned in future years.
See generally Thomas W. Giegerich, Monetization of Business Tax Credits, 12 FLA.
TAX REV. 709 (2012) (describing tax credit monetization). The tax credits are
earned over a period of ten years (in the case of the LIHTC) and seven years (in
the case of the NMTC). See I.R.C. §§ 42, 45D (2018).
71. See, e.g., 72 PA. STAT. ANN. § 8904-A(a) (West 2019) (allowing a tax credit
for business that engages in a range of statutorily defined activities in
impoverished areas); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 2004 (West 2019) (allowing a tax
credit for Delaware businesses that contribute to “a neighborhood organization”
or that provide “neighborhood assistance in an impoverished area”); see also Rick
Cohen, Nonprofits and State Tax Systems: The Big Picture, NONPROFIT Q. (Apr.
18, 2013), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/2013/04/18/nonprofits-and-state-taxsystems-the-big-picture/./ (providing an overview of the tax diversity from state
to state) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social
Justice).
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capital intensive projects. The first are tax credits that are
monetized through transactions with third-party investors in
low-income communities.72 This Article refers to this model as the
“tax equity model.” The second variation are tax laws that provide
temporary or permanent tax exemptions with respect to money or
property used to help finance businesses that invest in low-income
areas.73 This Article will refer to this model as the “fund model.”
Both models are explained in detail below, and their advantages
and disadvantages are discussed.
a. Tax Equity Model
Indirect tax subsidies adopting the tax equity model facilitate
project financing through a combination of public and private
investment. A key characteristic of the tax equity model is that the
size of the tax subsidy is often large enough to cover a substantial
portion of project costs, but access to the subsidy typically depends
on a process called tax credit monetization.74 As a practical matter,
monetization refers to “purchases” of tax credits by the third-party
investors, who size their investments based on the amount of tax
credits allocated.75 In other words, monetization transactions can
be understood as investments in tax credits. In addition to
explaining how the tax equity model works, this section will
explain how the identity of investors—and their motivation—may
affect the impact of these tax incentives.
Tax credit monetization is best explained through an
illustration, whereby a prototypical example is the approach taken
by the federal New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC).76 In the most
basic sense, the NMTC allows a tax credit to taxpayers who invest
in entities that, in turn, invest in businesses that engage with
72. See infra Part III.A.2.
73. See infra Part III.A.2.
74. See generally Giegerich, supra note 70 (describing tax credit
monetization).
75. See id. (characterizing tax credit monetization).
76. See I.R.C. § 45D (2018) (providing the new markets tax credit to
applicable taxpayers). The NMTC was introduced under the Clinton
Administration about seven years after the federal Empowerment Zone laws went
into effect. Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554,
§ 1(a)(7), 114 Stat. 2763.
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low-income communities.77 In practice, however, the value of the
NMTC is realized through sophisticated tax credit monetization
transactions. In the typical transaction, an investment group
certified as a “community development entity” (CDE)78 will apply
to the federal Community Development Financial Institutions
(CDFI) Fund for tax credit allocations.79 Nevertheless, despite the
allocation process, CDEs neither earn, nor claim, the tax credits.80
77. See I.R.C. § 45D(a) (2018) (providing a tax credit to taxpayers who make
“qualified equity investments,” which mean investments in a “qualified
community development entity”); I.R.C. §§ 45D(a), (b) (2018) (defining eligible
taxpayers); see also I.R.C. § 45D(c) (2018) (defining qualified community
development entity for purposes of 45D); I.R.C. § 45D(b)(3) (2018) (providing a
safe harbor); I.R.C. § 45D(d) (2018) (defining qualified low-income community
investments by). As such, the definition of “low-income community” dominates
the statutory scheme. See I.R.C. § 45D(e) (2018) (defining low-income
community).
78. To obtain certification as a CDE, the investment group must have a
primary mission of “serving, or providing investment capital for, low-income
communities or low-income persons.” See I.R.C. § 45D(c) (2018) (defining qualified
community development entity). As a practical matter, most CDE investments
are directed to statutorily defined “low-income communities.” Under the statute,
low-income communities refer to census tracts with a poverty rate of at least 20
percent, or which meet certain median family income thresholds. I.R.C. § 45D(e)
(2018):
The term “low-income community” means any population census tract if—the
poverty rate for such tract is at least 20 percent, or –in the case of a tract not
located within a metropolitan area, the median family income for such tract does
not exceed 80 percent of statewide median family income, or –in the case of a
tract located within a metropolitan area, the median family income for such tract
does not exceed 80 percent of the greater of statewide median family income or
the metropolitan area median family income. Id.
79. See DONALD J. MARPLES & SEAN LORY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34402,
NEW MARKETS TAX CREDIT: AN INTRODUCTION 2 (2016) (describing the criteria an
organization must meet to become certified as a CDE); see also New Markets Tax
Credit Program, CDFI FUND, https://www.cdfifund.gov/programs-training/
Programs/new-markets-tax-credit/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Mar. 19, 2019)
(explaining the NMTC application process) (on file with the Washington & Lee
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice); CDE Certification, CDFI FUND,
https://www.cdfifund.gov/programs-training/certification/cde/Pages/default.aspx
(last visited Mar. 19, 2019) (explaining the CDE certification process) (on file with
the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). In 2018, the CDFI
Fund was authorized to allocate $3.5 billion of NMTCs to CDEs. See I.R.C.
§ 45D(f)(1)(G) (2018).
80. See MARPLES & LORY, supra note 79, at 2 (describing CDEs as
intermediaries able to attract investors using the credits). Most CDEs are taxed
as partnerships under Subchapter K of the Internal Revenue Code. Partnership
income, loss, and other tax items are not subject to entity level taxation but are
instead taxable to the partners on their personal tax returns. See I.R.C. § 702
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Instead, they offer the tax credits to private equity investors who
make equity investments in for-profit CDEs.81 The amount of an
investor’s equity investment is sized based on the anticipated
future value of the tax credits, which they will earn over a
seven-year period.82
Another example of an indirect tax incentive that uses the tax
equity model is the low-income housing tax credit.83 Monetization
(2018) (providing a rule for tax credits for partnerships). Importantly, however,
the New Markets Tax Credit is not earned at the partnership level. Instead, it is
earned at the partner level. As explained later in this section, this distinction is
material to determining whether the investments may be subject to passive
activity loss limitations.
81. See MARPLES & LORY, supra note 79, at 1 (“After the CDE is awarded a
tax credit allocation, the CDE is authorized to offer the tax credits to private
equity investors in the CDE.”). Note that nonprofit CDEs can also apply for and
receive NMTC allocations, but only for-profit CDEs can pass the tax credits along
to its shareholders. Id.
82. See Eickhoff & Carter, supra note 14, at 77 (“If implemented successfully
the purchaser’s [sic] of the NMTC credits will be able to claim the 39 percent
NMTC over the subsequent 7 years.”).
83. See I.R.C. § 42 (2018) (stating the low-income housing credit statute).
The LIHTC provides a tax credit to taxpayers who invest in affordable housing
projects. The statute does not restrict the location of affordable housing projects,
and in that sense, it does not target low-income areas as closely as the NMTC.
Nevertheless, the statute does provide for larger tax credits when projects are
located in certain high-poverty areas. I.R.C. § 42(d)(5)(B) (2018) (providing for a
30% increase in tax credits for projects located in a “qualified census tract or a
difficult development area”). A qualified census tract is any census tract in which
“50 percent or more of the households have an income which is less than 60
percent of the area median gross income” or which “has a poverty rate of at least
25 percent.” I.R.C. § 42(d)(5)(B)(ii) (2018). A difficult development area is any area
designated by HUD as “an area which has high construction, land, and utility
costs relative to area median gross income.” I.R.C. § 42(d)(5)(B)(iii) (2018). This
creates an incentive to produce affordable housing in those targeted locations. See
Michelle D. Layser, How Federal Tax Law Rewards Housing Segregation, 93 IND.
L.J. 915, 949 (2018) (describing how projects located in economically and racially
segregated areas may be more likely to receive LIHTC allocations). In addition to
the NMTC, several other federal and state investment tax incentives adopt the
tax equity model. See generally Giegerich, supra note 70. Energy tax credits, like
the wind energy production tax credit and the solar tax credit, also adopt this
model, as do several investment tax credits. See I.R.C. § 48 (2018) (stating the
energy tax credit). The federal Rehabilitation Tax Credit also follows the tax
equity model in order to target place, but the targeted areas are not necessarily
low-income areas. See I.R.C. § 47 (2018) (stating the rehabilitation tax credit).
Rather, the Rehabilitation Tax Credit provides a tax incentive to rehabilitate
structures in “registered historic districts.” See I.R.C. § 42(c) (2018) (defining
qualified basis and qualified low-income buildings for purposes of LIHTC).
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of the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) follows a similar,
but distinct, pattern as the NMTC.84 Affordable housing developers
typically engage tax equity investors in monetization transactions
rather than using the tax credits directly.85 Investors contribute
capital to partnerships that own affordable housing projects.86 In
exchange for their contributions, the investors receive the right to
claim the tax credits as they are earned at the partnership level.87
These transactions provide a creative solution to a problem
that would otherwise render these indirect tax subsidies
ineffective. Namely, the greatest capital needs of projects are in
the early years, whereas the tax credits themselves are
delivered over a span of seven years (in the case of the NMTC)
or ten years (in the case of the LIHTC).88 An important purpose
of tax monetization transactions is to address this timing
mismatch.89 Tax equity investors size their investments
according to the expected value of tax credits to be earned in
the future, thereby enabling developers to use the entire credit
value presently even though much of the value will be
unavailable until future dates.90
On the other hand, the impact of indirect tax incentives
following the tax equity model is likely to be influenced by two
factors. First, the identity of investors and their motivation
84. See Giegerich, supra note 70, at 749–52 (describing the LIHTC as a
mechanism for delivering a federal subsidy to clearly defensible intended
beneficiaries).
85. See id. at 744–52 (describing the LIHTC as a carve-out from pre-tax
profit requirements and as a credit monetization technique). For a project to be
eligible for tax credits, the developer must first apply to state and local housing
authorities for tax credit allocations. As project owners, the developers of
approved tax credit projects would be eligible to claim the tax credits. But, in most
cases, the developers choose to monetize the tax credits.
86. See Desai et al., supra note 14, at 184–86 (describing the mechanics of
LIHTC allocation).
87. See id. at 186 (explaining that the deal is often structured as a limited
partnership between investors and developers).
88. See I.R.C. §§ 42, 45D (2018) (stating the applicable credit period for
LIHTC and NMTC respectively).
89. See Giegerich, supra note 70, at 748 (explaining that the “investor ‘fronts’
a rent subsidy on behalf of the federal government . . . and is ‘reimbursed’ by the
Treasury via the LIHTC”).
90. See Desai et al., supra note 14, at 189–90 (stating that the difference
between the current purchase price of credits and the value of credits represents
the investors’ return on investment).
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may affect the types of projects that are funded.91 CDEs and
developers are dependent on the participation of a specific pool
of investors who are willing and able to participate in tax credit
monetization.92 Nearly all tax equity investors are large
91. See JOINT CTR. HOUSE STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE DISRUPTION OF
THE LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT PROGRAM: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES,
RESPONSES,
AND
PROPOSED
CORRECTIVES
3–4
(2009),

http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/disruption_of_the_lihtc_program_
2009_0.pdf (describing how the migration of the investor base to financial
institutions concentrated investments on a limited number of large metropolitan
areas) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social
Justice).
92. See COHN REZNICK, infra note 98, at 3 (explaining that in 2012, 83% of
LIHTC investors were financial institutions); MARTIN D. ABRAVANEL ET AL., NEW
MARKETS TAX CREDIT (NMTC) PROGRAM EVALUATION: FINAL REPORT ix–x (2016),
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/24211/412958-newmarkets-tax-credit-nmtc-program-evaluation.pdf (noting that although the types
of investors varied, the highest proportion of investors “constituted large
international banks”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights
& Social Justice). Not only is the investor pool limited to those with sufficient cash
and tax liability to make the tax-motivated investments possible and worthwhile,
but it is further limited by features of the tax system designed to prevent abusive
tax shelters. For example, the so-called passive activity loss rules limit the ability
to prevent natural persons from claiming tax credits earned from passive
activities to the extent that they exceed the taxpayers’ income from passive
activities. See I.R.C. § 469(d)(2) (2018) (defining passive activity tax credit).
Passive activities include those involving the conduct of a trade or business in
which the taxpayer does not materially participate. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.4694 (2016)
(defining “Trade or business activities”); 26 C.F.R. § 1.469-5 (2016) (defining
“material participation”). Many monetization transactions are subject to this rule.
LIHTC investments are generally subject to passive activity loss rules. The
typical tax credit claimant is a passive, limited partner of a project partnership.
As such, the passive activity loss rules thus restrict the ability of natural persons
to claim full tax benefits. See I.R.C. § 469(i)(3)(C) (2018) (stating an exception for
low-income housing credit); see also OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER, LOW-INCOME
HOUSING TAX CREDITS: AFFORDABLE HOUSING INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR
BANKS 36 (Mar. 2014) (“The number of taxpayers who can benefit from LIHTCs
is limited by passive activity and alternative minimum tax rules.”). The practical
effect is to limit the capacity of the LIHTC to motivate natural persons to invest
in affordable housing projects. As a result, nearly all LIHTC investors are
corporations. See Forrest David Milder & Ronald S. Borod, Rehabilitation Tax
Credit and Low-Income Housing Tax Credit, BNA PORTFOLIO 584-1st, § 3:III
Passive Activity Limitations. In the context of the NMTC, on the other hand, the
IRS has stated that the passive activity loss rules are tested at the taxpayer-level
(not the CDE level). See Rev. Rul. 2010-16, 2010-26 I.R.B. 769 (June 28, 2010)
(ruling that the new markets tax credit will not be a passive activity credit under
§ 469 in situations where a qualified equity investment in a CDE is not made in
connection with a trade or business). Although the taxpayer typically owns an
equity interest in the CDE classified as a partnership interest, the tax credit itself
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financial institutions.93
One reason for this is that banks are cash-rich and are
usually capable of absorbing the tax credits.94 Another reason
is that non-tax law encourages these investments.95 Specifically,
the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) requires financial
institutions to invest in the low-income communities they service.96
Today, nearly all investment in tax-subsidized affordable housing
and community development projects comes from financial
institutions motivated primarily by the CRA.97
does not flow through from the partnership (CDE). See id. (“The CDE does not
pass through the new markets tax credit to the person claiming the new markets
tax Credit.”). Rather, under the statute, the tax credit is earned at the
partner- level when the taxpayer invests in the CDE. See id. (“The amount of the
new markets tax credit is determined based on a percentage of the amount paid
to the CDE for the qualified equity investment at its original issue.”). As such, a
threshold issue is whether the taxpayer acquired the equity interest in the CDE
in connection with conduct of a trade or business. See id. (stating that determining
whether the new markets tax credit is disallowed depends on whether the
acquisition of the qualified equity investment in the CDE arises in connection
with the conduct of a passive activity in connection with the conduct of a trade or
business). If so, the passive activity loss rules may apply if the taxpayer does not
materially participate in that trade or business; nevertheless, the IRS has ruled
that if the equity interest was not acquired in connection with conduct of a trade
or business, then the passive activity loss rules will not apply. See id. (“Where an
individual’s acquisition of a qualified equity investment in a CDE is not in
connection with the conduct of the individual’s trade or business (or in
anticipation of the individual’s trade or business), the new markets tax credit
allowable to an individual under § 45D will not be a passive activity credit under
§ 469.”). As such, the passive activity loss rules present a potential tripping point
for natural persons who plan to claim the NMTC, but not an absolute barrier.
93. See COHN REZNICK, infra note 98, at 3 (including the nation’s largest
financial institutions in a survey of the performance of properties financed with
low-income housing tax credits); ABRAVANEL ET AL., supra note 92, at x (“The
highest proportion of investors consisted of large international banks or other
regulated financial institutions.”).
94. See JOINT CTR. HOUSE STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., supra note 91, at 3
(stating that widely held corporations, including large financial institutions, can
use the credits to offset their incomes).
95. See Desai et al., supra note 14, at 191 (“The interaction with the CRA
opens up the possibility that entities may be willing to bid the price of tax credits
above their actuarially fair value as they can jointly realize tax advantages and
fulfill CRA obligations.”)
96. See 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (2018) (“It is the purpose of this chapter . . . to
encourage such institutions to help meet the credit needs of the local communities
in which they are chartered consistent with the safe and sound operation of such
institutions.”).
97. See JOINT CTR. HOUSE STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., supra note 94, at 4
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One implication of heavy reliance on CRA-motivated investors
is that the value of tax credits is linked to the location of major
financial institutions.98 Financial institutions tend to cluster in
large urban areas, and in those locations the competition among
banks for tax credit deals is high.99 This high demand pushes up
the price of the tax credits, crowding out nonbank competitors and
rendering developers still more dependent on financial
institutions.100
Nevertheless,
in
rural
areas
with
a
low-concentration of banks, the demand for tax credits is much
lower—and so are the prices.101 For example, one researcher
observed that urban investors would pay up to $1.20 per dollar of
tax credit, while rural investors would pay only $0.85 per dollar for
those same tax credits.102 This may render the tax credits less
effective in some markets than others.103
Second, it is worth noting that financial institutions,
syndicators and other parties involved with tax equity transactions
are, in this instance, place entrepreneurs—investors who profit on
(discussing the motivations of large banks as investors).
98. See COHN REZNICK, THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT AND ITS EFFECT
ON
HOUSING
TAX
CREDIT
PRICING
7
(2013),
http://ahic.org/images/downloads/Research_and_Education/the_community_rein
vestment_act_and_its_effect_on_housing_tax.pdf [hereinafter COHN REZNICK]
(“Cohn Reznick concludes that all else remaining constant, the more the market
is dominated by CRA-motivated investors who invest only in certain areas of the
country, the wider the pricing spread one may expect to see between areas with
intense CRA compliance demand and areas without.”) (on file with the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
99. See Cassandra Jones Havard, The Community Reinvestment Act, Banks,
and the Low Income Housing Tax Credit Investment, 26 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING
415, 424 (2017) (“Because the home offices of several large, national banks may
be geographically close, the CRA assessment areas may overlap. This creates
extreme competition for tax credits in certain locations.”).
100. See COHN REZNICK, supra note 98, at 6 (“Competition for housing tax
credit investments in areas with limited investment opportunities tends to create
a massive supply/demand imbalance.”).
101. See id. at 7 (comparing tax credit prices in highly sought-after markets
such as San Francisco and New York with prices in smaller metropolitan areas
like Indianapolis and Milwaukee).
102. See Havard, supra note 99, at 424–25 (describing how the presence of
large national banks has a deleterious effect on the pricing infrastructure of the
LIHTC program due to extreme competition for tax credits in certain locations).
103. See id. at 425 (stating that although there may be a significant need for
affordable housing in rural markets, lower tax credits and lack of investors lowers
supply).
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place.104 This may be especially relevant in the context of
community development incentives, because place entrepreneurs
are likely to prefer investments in areas they expect to gentrify and
yield significant returns, whereas poor communities may be wary
of gentrification.105 In this way, the identity of investors may affect
how the tax incentives ultimately impact communities.106
b. Fund Model
The second model of indirect tax subsidies is the fund model.
Like the tax equity model, the fund model encourages private,
third-party investment in entities that, in turn, invest in
low-income communities. But, the mechanism used to encourage
these investments is distinct. Tax incentives using the fund model
do not require monetization. Instead, taxpayers are provided a
current tax benefit when they contribute money to an investment
vehicle, such as a partnership or corporation, that is required to
make certain spatially targeted investments. As this section
explains, the fund model expands the pool of investors beyond CRA
investors, providing an imperfect answer to one problem presented
by the tax equity model.
Specifically, the fund model expands the pool of potential
investors by presenting tax savings opportunities for taxpayers
beyond the institutional investors who traditionally participate in
tax credit monetization transactions. These tax preferences
encourage investors to pool together relatively small amounts of
capital from a large number of investors.107 In this way, the funds
104. See Thomas F. Gieryn, A Space for Place in Sociology, 26 ANN. REV. SOC.
463, 469–70 (2000) (stating that place entrepreneurs aim to extract ever greater
amounts of exchange value from commodified property).
105. See Layser, supra note 22, at 25–26 (tracing the pro-gentrification origins
of place-based tax incentive programs and conflicts created between
place entrepreneurs and poor communities).
106. See id (describing the current landscape of place-based investment tax
incentives and their impact).
107. Moreover, the anti-abuse rules that limit individual taxpayers’ ability to
engage in monetization transactions may present less of a barrier in the context
of tax incentives adopting the fund model. For example, the passive activity loss
rules apply to tax losses and credits, but they do not reach tax exemptions like
those that are available under Opportunity Zones laws. Therefore, the pool of
potential investors can include individuals in addition to institutional investors.
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can accumulate enough capital to make large project investments
without the need for tax equity investors. In this respect, the fund
model has a significant advantage over the tax equity model;
however, there are also disadvantages to the approach.
First, the fund model may present an even larger risk than the
tax equity model that the interests of investors will conflict with
the interests of low-income communities.108 The tax equity
investors described above may be willing to invest in a project that
is unlikely to yield much economic return because the tax credit
“purchase” is lucrative once the price is discounted to provide a
yield.109 They may also be relatively indifferent to the economic
return because of non-economic motivations, such as the need for
credit under the CRA.110 In contrast, investors motivated by fund
model incentives may require real economic returns since the
value of the tax benefits may be comparatively small.111 As a result,
investors may press for investments that are most likely to
maximize profits, regardless of whether those projects also benefit
poor communities.112
Second, though the pool of investors is larger under the fund
model, it is still likely to be limited to a relatively small number of
108. See infra notes 111–112 and accompanying text.
109. See Eickhoff & Carter supra note 14, at 77 (describing how the New
Markets Tax Credit is transferred to third-party investors at a discounted price
and in return the investor will receive a seven-year tax credit).
110. See COHN REZNICK, supra note 98, at 4 (“[T]he Community Reinvestment
Act has been an enormously successful vehicle for assembling capital for the
development of affordable housing”).
111. Requirements for tax incentives such as the CRA motivate investors
under the tax equity model, but investors under the fund model are not motivated
by tax incentives; rather, they are motivated by actual return on their financial
investment. Compare Investors, OPPORTUNITY FUND, https://www.opportunity
fund.org/about/investors/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2019) (“As a Community
Development Financial Institution (CDFI) certified by the U.S. Treasury
Department, your investment in Opportunity Fund may qualify for Community
Reinvestment Act (CRA) credit.”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of
Civil Rights & Social Justice), with Sarah O’Brien, Heard the Buzz About
Opportunity Zone Funds? Here’s the Skinny, CNBC (Nov. 18, 2018, 10:42 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/31/heard-the-buzz-about-opportunity-zone-fundsheres-the-skinny.html (describing how funds must be invested in projects within
the opportunity zone) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights
& Social Justice).
112. See O’Brien, supra note 111 (“While the new opportunity zone funds
seem poised to attract investors looking to both minimize their taxes and do it in
a way that benefits struggling communities, there are skeptics.”).
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wealthy taxpayers.113 This may be especially true in the context of
tax incentives like the new Opportunity Zones law that offer
capital gains tax relief.114 In 2012, well over half of capital gains
were reported by individual taxpayers who had adjusted gross
incomes of $1 million or more.115 That same group was responsible
for only 0.27% of tax returns,116 suggesting that a tiny percentage
of taxpayers, comprised by some of the wealthiest Americans, have
the greatest need to shelter capital gains. In short, the potential
claimants of indirect tax subsidies—whether tax equity investors
or fund model investors—are both limited and skewed to the very
wealthy.117
To summarize, therefore, the first dimension of the typology
asks whether the tax-based subsidy is delivered directly to
businesses that are located in (or engage with) low-income areas,
or whether they are delivered to investors of those businesses.118
The form of subsidy may affect what parties have the power to
control which businesses receive the subsidies and whether the
subsidies are capable of supporting large projects.119 It is
important to note, at this point, that all investment tax
113. Cf. O’Brien, supra note 111 (“I think the program is well-intentioned and
not intended as a giveaway to rich guys or anything like that . . . . But it will be
hard to measure whether it’s working or not.”) (internal quotations omitted).
114. See infra notes 219–221 and accompanying text.
115. SOI Tax Stats-Sales of Capital Assets Reported on Individual Tax
Returns, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-sales-of-capital-assetsreported-on-individual-tax-returns (last visited Mar. 7, 2019) (showing that
50.32% of short-term capital gains and 63.75% of long-term capital gains were
reported by taxpayers with adjusted gross income greater than $1 million in 2012)
(on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
116. See id. (showing that taxpayers with an adjusted gross income greater
than $1 million in 2012 accounted for 288,555 out of the 10,856,594 tax returns
with short-term capital gain or loss reported).
117. See Aaron Waites & Jason Walker, Qualified Opportunity Zones: What
FARGO
(Aug.
2018),
Investors
Should
Know,
WELLS
https://www.wellsfargo.com/the-private-bank/insights/planning/wpu-qualifiedopportunity-zones/ (advising on wealth planning that “[i]f you are facing
significant tax payments as a result of capital gains, investing in a Qualified
Opportunity Zone Fund may be worth exploring”) (on file with the Washington &
Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
118. See supra Part II.A (describing the two-dimensional typology to describe
categories of place-based investment tax incentives).
119. Compare Part II.A.1 (discussing characteristics of direct tax subsidies),
with Part II.A.2 (distinguishing characteristics of indirect tax subsidies).
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incentives—regardless of whether they are place-based—can be
designed in either direct or indirect forms. The second dimension,
which is described in the next section, looks specifically at the
spatial component of place-based investment tax incentives.120
B. The Second Dimension: Space versus Community
The second dimension of the typology focuses on the spatial
component of place-based investment tax incentives.121 To fully
understand how tax law—or any law—targets place, it is
important to understand the nature of that target.122 A “place” can
be defined abstractly as a location in space that not only has
natural and built physical forms like rivers, buildings and streets,
but also has a social interpretation.123 The social interpretation is
what makes a place a home, a school, a church, a playground—or
a neighborhood, like those targeted by place-based investment tax
incentives.124
A neighborhood connotes a geographic location with material
form—natural and built environments—that is interpreted,
named, and given meaning and value by the people who live and
invest there.125 Specifically, a neighborhood is an interpretation of
120. See supra Part II.B (discussing whether tax law prioritizes profitability
of space or whether it prioritizes improved neighborhood conditions for the benefit
of the community that lives in that space.)
121. See generally EDWARD L. GLASSER, THE ECONOMICS OF LOCATION-BASED
TAX INCENTIVES (Harv. Inst. Econ. Research Oct. 29, 2001) (“In general, I argue
that tax incentives will generally lead to more efficient locational decisions.”).
122. See infra notes 128–131 and accompanying text.
123. See Gieryn, supra note 104, at 464–66 (describing the relationship
between geographic location, material form, and investment with meaning or
value). Stated differently, where space itself is a geometric concept based on
metrics like distance, direction, size and shape, place can be understood as a space
filled with people, practices, objects and representation. See id. at 465 (“Space is
what place becomes when the unique gathering of things, meanings, and values
are sucked out.”).
124. See HILARY GELFOND & ADAM LOONEY, LEARNING FROM OPPORTUNITY
ZONES:
HOW
TO
IMPROVE
PLACE-BASED
POLICIES
10
(2018),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Looney_OpportunityZones_final.pdf (“The geographic targeting of incentives is crucial for determining
whether place-based incentives are effective and benefit residents of distressed
areas.”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social
Justice).
125. See Gieryn, supra note 104, at 465 (defining the neighborhood by
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place that references a space filled with the following elements:
Physical structures (e.g., buildings, roads, parks, public spaces);
neighbors (e.g., people who may be rich or poor, integrated or
segregated, home owners or renters, employed or unemployed,
married or unmarried, politically powerful or politically
marginalized); resources (e.g., service agencies and nonprofits,
stores and groceries, transportation); and local institutions (e.g.,
schools, churches, libraries, hospitals, police and fire stations,
major businesses).126
Scholars have articulated a variety of theories to describe the
subject of geographic study in ways that account for the
combination of locational characteristics, on the one hand, and
social meaning, on the other.127 Among these are theories that
distinguish between space and place.128 In a study of distressed
communities and community business entrepreneurship, business
scholar Harvey Johnstone and geographer Doug Lionais explained
the complexity of areas labeled as “depleted communities:”129
Depleted communities are manifestations of uneven
development. They are communities where the economy is in
decline and the resources of the area, according to profit-seeking
capital, are ‘used up.’ However, depleted communities are more
than simply locations that lack growth mechanisms; they are
also areas to which people retain an attachment. A depleted
community, therefore, continues to exist as a social entity

adopting a definition of place, set forth by sociologist Thomas Gieryn, as
comprised of three prongs: Geographic location, material form, and investment
with meaning and value).
126. See id. (defining “place” as comprised of geographic location (e.g. “your
favorite armchair, a room, building, neighborhood, district, village, city, county,
metropolitan region”), material form (e.g. “physicality, whether built or natural—
a compilation of things or objects at some particular spot in the universe”), and
an investment with meaning and value).
127. See, e.g., B.S. Morgan, Social Geography, Spatial Structure and Social
Structure, 9(3) GEOJOURNAL 301, 301 (1984) (“[S]patial structure is largely a
reflection of aspects of social structure.”).
128. See Harvey Johnstone & Doug Lionais, Depleted Communities and
Community Business Entrepreneurship: Revaluing Space Through Place, 16
ENTREPRENEUR REG. DEV. 217, 217 (May 2004) (“Depleted communities . . . can be
seen as areas that have lost much of their economic rationale as space, while
retaining high attachments and social relations of place.”).
129. See id. (arguing “that depleted communities can act as hosts to a unique
form of enterprise that combines good business practices with community goals”).
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because it is shaped by positive social forces as well as by
negative economic forces.130

For this reason, Johnstone and Lionais distinguish between space,
which is “the location of profitable enterprise,” and place, which is
“the location of social life.”131 This second dimension of the typology
draws upon these theories about space and place to describe the
spatial component of place-based investment tax incentives.
Specifically, the second dimension asks whether the tax law
prioritizes improved profitability within a space, or whether it
prioritizes improved neighborhood conditions for the benefit of
community residents. Tax laws that prioritize profitability are
referred to as spatially-oriented, a description that maps on to
Johnstone and Lionais’s definition of space.132 In contrast, tax laws
that prioritize improved neighborhood conditions, such as by
addressing environmental needs of community residents, are
referred to here as community-oriented. This latter description
corresponds to Johnstone and Lionais’ definition of place.133
Stated differently, legislators must choose whether to use tax
incentives to improve the economic and physical conditions within
spatial boundaries—regardless of how those changes impact
communities—or to use tax incentives to improve how community
members experience those conditions.134 This decision, in
particular, may have a notable impact on the tax laws’ effect on
poor residents. This is because, at minimum, community-oriented
conceptions of place include safeguards to protect poor residents
from harms associated with neighborhood change, while
spatially-oriented investment tax incentives lack such features.
Place-based investment tax incentives can be sorted along this
dimension by assessing whether they include safeguards for local
130. Id. at 218.
131. Id. at 219 (separating the ideas of space from place can help determine
how depleted communities can improve responsiveness to new business
development).
132. See id. at 218 (“[S]pace . . . is an economic (capitalistic) evaluation of
location based on its capacity for profit.”).
133. See id. (“[P]lace . . . is a social evaluation of location based on meaning.”).
134. This choice mirrors the debate between traditional place-based programs
and people-oriented place-based programs. See, e.g., Amy T. Khare, Putting
People Back into Place-Based Public Policies, 37 J. URB. AFF. 47, 49 (2015)
(contrasting policies that implicitly prioritize “spatial conceptions of community”
to programs that “invest in groups of people who live in areas being targeted”).
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residents, whether they are designed to encourage firms to engage
with the community, and whether their objective is clearly to
benefit local residents.135 The remainder of this section will
elaborate on this dimension, focusing not only on what can be
observed in the current landscape of place-based investment tax
incentives, but also on ideal characteristics.
1. Spatially-Oriented Tax Incentives
In the most general sense, a tax incentive can be described as
spatially-oriented if it promotes investments within geographic
boundaries with the sole purpose of maximizing economic growth
within that area. For example, the incentives may be designed to
encourage new businesses to locate in a low-income area, or they
may be designed to help existing businesses expand. They may
encourage developers to site projects in a particular neighborhood.
They may include incentives for businesses to create jobs or
rehabilitate housing.
Any of these activities may, under the right circumstances,
benefit local residents. But spatially-oriented incentives leave
their impact on residents entirely to chance.136 Tax subsidized
businesses may create jobs, or they may invest instead in new
computer technology.137 When they create jobs, the tax subsidized
businesses may hire local residents, or they may employ
commuters from other parts of the region.138 Tax subsidized
developers may rehabilitate dilapidated housing to create new,

135. See Layser, supra note 22, at 68–69 (setting forth the following three
principles for designing community-oriented investment tax incentives: Confer
power to community members; link place to community; and include clear and
measurable objectives).
136. See infra notes 137–139 and accompanying text for examples of how
businesses that receive spatially-oriented incentives use the financial benefit to
impact entities other than local communities.
137. See generally Daniel G. Garrett, et al., NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RES., Tax
Policy and Local Labor Market Behavior, NBER Working Paper No. 25546 (Feb.
2019), http://www.nber.org/papers/w25546 (on file with the Washington & Lee
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
138. See Freedman, supra note 15, at 1013 (“I find some evidence that
investment subsidized under the NMTC program reduces poverty and
unemployment rates in relatively low-income census tracts”).
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higher-quality affordable housing in the area, or they may create
condominiums for a higher-income demographic.139
The key feature of spatially-oriented tax incentives is the
absence of safeguards for poor communities.140 To analyze whether
a place-based investment tax incentive is spatially-oriented, the
key inquiry is whether the law contains features to increase the
likelihood that that poor residents in a targeted area will benefit.141
A variety of factors are relevant to the analysis.142 Three factors
that tend to suggest that an incentive is spatially-oriented are the
following: (1) very broad or undefined categories of eligible
investments;143 (2) general incentives to invest in human capital
through hiring or job training;144 and (3) taxpayer eligibility
requirements based solely on the location of the taxpayer.145

139. See Mark L. Joseph, Is Mixed-Income Development an Antidote to Urban
Poverty?, 17 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 209, 212–13 (2006) (describing the
displacement of poor tenants whose buildings were replaced with mixed income
units).
140. In approaching this inquiry, one should keep separate the empirical
question of what kind of investments the tax incentives tend to subsidize from the
issue of what kind of investments they are permitted to subsidize. It is at least
theoretically possible that, even without safeguards for poor communities,
investors may use the tax incentives to subsidize investment that benefit poor
communities. However, even if these tax incentives were proven to consistently
benefit poor communities, their design would still be spatially-oriented due to the
lack of safeguards. Such empirical results would merely suggest that
spatially-oriented tax incentives may be effective anti-poverty tools, and that
safeguards for the poor would be unnecessary for tax incentives used for this
purpose.
141. See Helen F. Ladd, Spatially Targeted Economic Development Strategies:
Do They Work?, CITYSCAPE 193, 195 (“A more direct approach to dealing with
pockets of urban distress in urban areas involves using place-specific assistance
to help the residents—especially the disadvantaged residents—of distressed
urban areas.”).
142. See, e.g., infra notes 146–156 and accompanying text (describing the
factors suggesting a spatially-oriented incentive).
143. See infra notes 146–148 and accompanying text (explaining how broad
or undefined categories of eligible investments fail to assure that investments
benefit poor communities).
144. See infra notes 149–152 and accompanying text (explaining how general
job hiring or training requirements fail to assure that investments benefit poor
communities).
145. See infra notes 153–156 and accompanying text (explaining how
eligibility requirements based solely on location fail to assure that investments
benefit poor communities).
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First, broad or undefined categories of eligible investments
suggest a spatial-orientation because they allow market
participants to determine the specific types of investments to be
subsidized, and there is no assurance that profit-seeking investors
will choose investments that benefit poor communities.146 To the
contrary, the interests of place-entrepreneurs—investors who
profit through place-based investments—often conflict with the
needs of local communities.147 To avoid such results, a law may
require certifications from project developers or include
mechanisms to monitor outcomes.148 The failure to include any
such features suggests the law is spatially-oriented.
Second, general incentives to invest in human capital tend to
suggest a spatial-orientation because they encourage businesses to
develop their workforce in the way they deem most profitable,
without regard to whether area residents benefit.149 In other
words, general incentives to hire employees do not encourage
businesses to hire residents, and businesses may well look to
commuters to meet their hiring needs.150 When this happens, poor
residents may be passed over for jobs.151 In addition, they may
146. See Gieryn, supra note 104, at 470 (discussing how local investors
“sometimes face resistance from community organizers more concerned about the
use-value of place, who oppose growth because of its detrimental consequences for
neighborhood quality of life or environmental health”).
147. The fact that the government requires monitoring of local outcomes
resulting from investments indicates that investors have alternative motivations
for investing, other than community benefits. Cf. CONG. RES. SERV., TAX
INCENTIVES FOR OPPORTUNITY ZONES: IN BRIEF 7 (Nov. 20, 2018) (“NMTC
recipients are required to adhere to a set of outcome-based reporting and
compliance requirements. These metrics track the location and type of projects
funded by NMTC allocations.”).
148. See id. (describing the reporting requirements for recipients of
Opportunity Zones tax incentives that tract outcomes for local communities).
149. See Freedman, supra note 15, at 1013 (“Although place-based policies
have grown in importance in recent decades, many remain skeptical of their
efficacy. Lending credence to this skepticism are numerous studies on programs
such as state EZs that suggest that there is little to no benefit associated with
subsidizing investment in struggling cities and neighborhoods.”).
150. See Freedman, supra note 15, at 1013 (suggesting that place-based
incentives may not look to local residents in their hiring, meaning the local
communities do not experience any job prospect improvement).
151. Cf. Rikha Sharma Rani, Avoiding Gentrification, How to Use
Opportunity Zones to Benefit Communities, FUSE CORPS (Feb. 12, 2019),
https://fusecorps.org/2019/02/12/avoiding-gentrification-how-to-use-opportunityzones-to-benefit-communities/ (“Public investments can also help ensure that
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suffer further harm if commuting outsiders move into the area and
displace residents through gentrification.152
Third, taxpayer eligibility requirements based solely on the
location of the taxpayer suggest a spatial-orientation because they
help ensure that the targeted area will become a profit center, but
they do not require engagement with the community.153 Location
requirements may help ensure that residents gain the benefit of a
local business or that investors improve the environment in their
community.154 As such, most place-based investment tax
incentives should—and do—include location among the eligibility
criteria.155 However, merely locating in an area is insufficient to
ensure engagement with local residents. Without some
requirement that the businesses engage with the local community
in some way, eligibility based on location likely belies a
spatially-oriented tax incentive.156
To a large degree, analyzing whether a tax incentive is
spatially-oriented involves the task of proving a negative: The
residents and business owners are prepared for opportunity zone
projects . . . . Officials are also on the lookout for opportunities to enhance local
participation in projects.”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil
Rights & Social Justice).
152. See id. (“In some urban areas, for example, where gentrification has
already priced out long-time residents, investments could exacerbate the issue
and displace even more of the people meant to benefit from the incentives.”).
153. See CONG. RES. SERV., supra note 147 (“[T]o become eligible for a NMTC
allocation, a certified CDE must, among other criteria, have a primary mission of
serving or providing investment capital to low-income communities. A governing
or advisory board is supposed to hold the CDE accountable to that mission.”)
154. See CONG. RES. SERV., supra note 147 (“QOFs are not required to be
mission-oriented for the primary purposes of serving low-income communities or
persons.”).
155. See infra Appendix C (showing that all but two states that have current
enterprise zone programs require the taxpayer’s business or property to be located
in the enterprise zone).
156. See CONG. RES. SERV., supra note 147, at 1 (explaining that Opportunity
Zone tax incentives, for example require investment in a qualified low-income
community but does not require any additional engagement within the
community); see also Lorraine Mirabella, Hogan Proposes $56.5 Million to Spur
Development and Business Creation in Maryland 'Opportunity Zones', BALT. SUN
(Jan. 3, 2019, 2:00 PM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/business/bs-bz-hoganopportunity-zone-state-invesmtment-20190103-story.html (stating that some
states have implemented grant programs that provide training programs for
residents of these zones) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil
Rights & Social Justice).
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absence of features expressly linking benefits to the local
community.157 This task is made especially difficult by the rarity
of community-oriented incentives to serve as a foil.158
Nevertheless, the current legal landscape does include multiple
imperfect examples of community-oriented tax incentives that
contrast with spatially-oriented incentives, thereby helping to
guide the inquiry. The next section will elaborate upon the
characteristics of community-oriented tax incentives.
2. Community-Oriented Tax Incentives
A tax incentive is community-oriented if it includes features
that help ensure that residents will benefit from the
investments.159 In other words, where spatially-oriented tax
incentives promote economic growth within a space without any
safeguard for local communities, community-oriented tax
incentives seek to improve neighborhood conditions for the benefit
of community residents. Ideally, they would be designed or
implemented with input from community residents; they would
maintain the link between community members and the targeted
place; and they would articulate clear objectives and include a
mechanism for monitoring outcomes.160
Under current law, few (if any) tax incentives embody the
ideal. The key feature of community-oriented investment tax
incentives is the inclusion of safeguards to help increase the
chances that poor communities will benefit from the tax law.
Unlike their spatially-oriented counterparts, community-oriented
investment tax incentives do not leave their impact on poor
157. See supra notes 146, 149, and accompanying text (describing factors that
must seek to discover the absence of local impact generated by spatially-oriented
incentives); supra note 156 and accompanying text (same).
158. See Part III.B (discussing the spatial component of place-based
investment tax incentives).
159. See Khare, supra note 134 (criticizing the history of federal investment
into urban neighborhoods in ways that overtly prioritize change to the spatial
environment—these communities as places—while leaving unresolved the
conflicts over how the communities of people living there are intended to benefit).
160. See Layser, supra note 22, at 68 (“Though these principles should guide
the design of any community oriented investment tax incentives, the specifics
may vary widely as different communities seek to address their unique
circumstances.”).
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communities entirely to chance.161 Instead, they are designed with
the specific goal of benefiting poor communities, and they include
features specifically for this purpose.162 The presence of such
features is sufficient to designate a tax law as community-oriented,
regardless of whether such safeguards ultimately prove effective.
In other words, the empirical question of impact should be
separate from the inquiry into whether the tax law is designed as
a community-oriented incentive. Even ideal models of
community-oriented investment tax incentives may sometimes fail
to benefit the community.163 This is because community-oriented
investment tax incentives, like all place-based policies, are likely
to be constrained by mobility effects.164 In other words, people are
mobile, and neighborhood conditions may affect who comes and
goes from the community, regardless of whether the law includes
safeguards.165 For example, instead of displacement through
gentrification, community-oriented tax incentives may increase
the likelihood of voluntary exiting of the community.166
To see why, consider incentives that specifically encourage
businesses to hire community residents. If successful, there is a
risk that residents may become more mobile, and less willing to
remain in an otherwise distressed neighborhood, as their economic

161. See id. at 68 (“The primary goal of any community oriented investment
tax incentive should be to improve neighborhood conditions in poor
communities.”).
162. See id. at 18 (“At a minimum, a community oriented investment must
include some safeguard to prevent poor residents from being harmed, while
spatially oriented investment tax incentives lack such safeguards.”).
163. See id. at 68 (“[I]t is difficult to find examples of pure, community
oriented investment tax incentives under current law.”).
164. See Nestor M. Davidson, Reconciling People and Place in Housing and
Community Development Policy Essay, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 1, 2
(2009) (“[E]very public investment in a given place not only has a direct impact
on the people in that place but more importantly shapes the incentives that people
have to remain, leave, avoid, or move to that place.”). Focusing on gentrification,
Davidson points out that place-based strategies like investment tax incentives
“change[] the underlying incentive structure for individual mobility, making
displacement—and its associated harms—an enduring risk.” Id. at 8.
165. See id. at 8. (“People move or stay based on the resources they have as
well as the opportunities they can access, and mobility programs directly target
resource questions.”).
166. See id. (discussing how the resources that a person has access to affects
their decision to stay in or leave their community).

A TYPOLOGY OF PLACE-BASED INVESTMENT TAX INCENTIVES 439
conditions improve.167 If those residents leave, they may harm the
community they left behind, potentially exacerbating concentrated
poverty.168 However, other factors may help mitigate this risk.
First, the social context that helps give meaning to places and
communities also serves as an anchor.169 Within economically
distressed communities, the “emotional bonds and [ ] social
benefits of living there create a powerful resistance to leaving.”170
Those same ties would continue to exist even as community
members become more mobile, helping to keep those people within
the community even as they become more economically stable.171
Second, the risk that residents will leave may be mitigated
through other types of investment in the community, such as
improvements to the built environment or the expansion of area
businesses that meet specific community needs. Such
improvements are, after all, often an important component to
improving neighborhood conditions,172 and they may affect
whether community members are willing to remain even as their
167. See id. at 7 (“As people move, the social fabric of a community can be
damaged by the loss of certain members and a strategy that incentivizes that
movement can have direct consequences on the communities from which people
are escaping.”).
168. See id. (discussing how this can further isolate those not able or
unwilling to leave). One theory that has been advanced to explain the causes of
concentrated poverty is the class-selective migration of middle- and working-class
blacks out of poor neighborhoods; however, Douglas Massey and his colleagues
disputed this theory, concluding that patterns of out-migration from poor ghetto
areas had relatively little to do with the accumulation of poverty in black
neighborhoods. See Douglas S. Massey, Andrew B. Gross & Kumiko Shibuya,
Migration, Segregation, and the Geographic Concentration of Poverty, 59 AM. SOC.
REV. 425, 433 (1994) (“Rather, our results suggest that the geographic
concentration of poor blacks is caused by the residential segregation of
African- Americans in urban housing markets.”).
169. See Johnstone and Lionais, supra note 128, at 218 (“[D]epleted
communities are more than simply locations that lack growth mechanisms; they
are also areas to which people retain an attachment.”).
170. Id.
171. See Davidson, supra note 164, at 7 (discussing how the movement of
certain individuals out of the community can damage the community’s social
fabric). This same phenomenon has been noted as a restraint on mobility
programs that depend on voucher-holding residents choosing to leave their
communities in search of higher-opportunity neighborhoods.
172. See Johnstone and Lionais, supra note 128, at 217 (“While conditions in
depleted communities can limit possibilities for traditional development,
entrepreneurial responses are not similarly constrained.”).
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economic position stabilizes.173 To be sure, such improved
conditions may also serve to attract higher-income clientele,
thereby presenting a risk of gentrification.174 But again, such risk
may not be as high as it seems, particularly if the laws are used to
target areas with a high concentration of poverty—over 40%
poverty rate175—which may be less likely to gentrify, at least in the
near term. In other words, we will not know to what extent that
mobility effects limit the efficacy of community-oriented
incentives, notwithstanding their safeguards, until such tax laws
are studied empirically.
To analyze whether a place-based investment tax incentive is
community-oriented, then, the core inquiry mirrors that of
spatially-oriented incentives: Ask whether the tax law contains
features to increase the likelihood that poor residents in the
targeted area will benefit. Here, three factors that tend to suggest
that an incentive is community-oriented are: Relatively narrow or
defined categories of eligible investments of a variety that is likely
to benefit poor communities; incentives to invest in workforce
development for the benefit of residents of targeted communities;
and taxpayer eligibility requirements based on the extent to which
the taxpayer engages with community residents.
First, relatively narrow or defined categories of eligible
investments may be used to limit the scope of eligible investments
to those most likely to benefit poor communities. Such constraints
on eligible investments can serve as a safeguard for the targeted
community by making it less likely that the incentive will
subsidize businesses that primarily benefit higher-income
populations. As explained in Part III.B.2 below, this feature is rare
under current law.176

173. See id. at 229 (discussing how entrepreneurs can use certain assets
within depleted communities to motivate the community’s residents to remain).
174. See Davidson, supra note 164, at 9 (“As communities become more
desirable, more affluent residents are drawn in.”).
175. See Andrew Jordan Greenlee, A Relational Analysis of Mobility Within
Illinois’ Housing Choice Voucher 27 (2012) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Illinois at Chicago) (“[A] poverty rate of 40 percent tends to correlate
strongly with other indicators of disadvantage and lack of opportunity.”).
176. See infra Part III. B.2 (discussing examples of community-oriented
investment tax incentives that exist under current law and pertinent studies).
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Second, tax incentives to invest in workforce development may
be community-oriented if they specifically encourage the taxpayer
to hire or train poor residents of targeted communities. Such a
requirement can serve as a safeguard against the possibility that
new jobs ultimately inure to outsiders. For example, as explained
in Part III.B.1 below, some states provide incentives to hire
community residents.177
Third, tax incentives may be community-oriented if, instead of
focusing on a taxpayer’s location as the sole eligibility criteria, the
tax incentive makes engagement with residents an eligibility
requirement. This factor looks to the location of community
residents, and the extent to which the taxpayer engages with those
residents, as indicative of a community-orientation. This is
because such incentives do not treat the targeted place as an
economic space, where economic activity must occur entirely
within its boundaries, but rather as the location of a community
that should be targeted for benefits. For example, as explained in
Part III.B.1178 below, Texas provides hiring tax credits to firms—
from any location—that hire from three pools of employees, one of
which includes those who reside within zones.179
In sum, on the broadest level, lawmakers must decide whether
to target spaces—geographic boundaries where businesses or
property must locate—or communities, which exist within such
places, giving them social meaning. This choice is revealed through
the decision to include safeguards for local communities, or to
exclude them, and it must be made regardless of whether the tax
law is structured as a direct or indirect tax subsidy. The next Part
will use the two-by-two typology to identify four basic categories of
place-based investment tax incentives, and it will revisit empirical
studies within this framework.

177. See infra Part III. B.1 (discussing community-oriented tax incentives in
several states).
178. See id. (discussing Texas’s enterprise zone law and how it benefits
economically-disadvantaged residents).
179. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2303.402 (West 2019) (providing that
businesses outside of the enterprise zone are eligible for benefits if 35% of their
newly created positions are held by residents of an enterprise zone, veterans, or
economically-disadvantaged persons). The other two categories are veterans or
economically disadvantaged persons. See infra Part III. B.1 (discussing
community-oriented tax incentives in several states).
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III. Application of the Typology

The previous Part described two dimensions by which placebased investment tax incentives can be analyzed. The next step is
to use the two-by-two typology to identify four types of place-based
investment tax incentives characterized along these two
dimensions:
(1) spatially-oriented
direct
tax
incentives;
(2) spatially-oriented
indirect
tax
incentives;
(3) community-oriented
direct
tax
incentives;
(4) community-oriented indirect tax incentives.
In connection with this project, I surveyed the state enterprise
zone laws for all states that currently have enterprise zone laws,180
plus a variety of federal laws (the New Markets Tax Credit,181 the
Low-Income Housing Tax Credit,182 and Opportunity Zones183).
The survey revealed only a handful of examples of features that
reflect community approaches to targeting place.184 The table
below provides examples of each type, which are explained in
greater detail in this Part.

180. See generally Michelle D. Layser, How Do Place-Based Investment Tax
Incentives Target Low-Income Communities? A Multi-State Survey of Enterprise
Zone Tax Incentives (Working Paper, May 1, 2019).
181. I.R.C. § 45D (2018).
182. I.R.C. § 42 (2018).
183. I.R.C. § 1400Z-1 (2018).
184. See infra Appendices A–C.
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Dimension
#1:
Form of

Dimension #2: Approach to Targeting
Place

Subsidy

Spatially-oriented

Community-oriented

Direct

Most enterprise

Some enterprise zone

zone laws

laws

NMTC,

Some state tax credit

Opportunity Zones

programs

Indirect

A. Spatially-Oriented Tax Incentives
1. Direct Tax Incentives
Most tax incentives included in state enterprise zone laws are
spatially-oriented direct tax incentives. First, the incentives are
properly characterized as direct tax subsidies because the tax
preference available through these programs are claimed directly
by the eligible businesses, not by investors.185 Second, most—but
not all—enterprise zone tax incentives lack safeguards for
community residents and include factors that tend to indicate a
spatially-oriented incentive.186
185. See Layser, supra note 22, at 17 (“[I]f a business is entitled to a tax break
because it expands its activities in a low-income community, then the tax law
provides a direct tax subsidy to that business.”).
186. See id. at 38–39 (“The pro-gentrification origins of enterprise zone laws
help explain the dominance of spatially oriented investment tax incentives that
do not include any safeguards for poor communities.”).
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Specifically, enterprise zone laws often have broad
descriptions of eligible businesses.187 Many states limit the subsidy
to certain types of businesses, such as manufacturers and
producers,188 but there is little indication that such businesses are
categorically more likely to benefit community residents, and the
laws rarely require eligible taxpayers to engage with the
community.189 The tax incentive package available to those
businesses varies by state, but in most cases, it includes some
combination of capital and labor incentives.190 However, the labor
incentives usually take the form of general incentives to invest in
human capital through hiring or job training, and they rarely
require firms to hire local residents.191 And in almost all cases,
eligibility is based at least partially upon the location of the firm
within zone boundaries, regardless of the firm’s level of
engagement with the community.192
Many empirical studies have sought to measure the
impact of enterprise zone laws, providing some insight into how
spatially-oriented direct tax incentives affect poor communities.193
187. See infra Appendix A (showing that 18/33 state enterprise zone laws
have broad or undefined descriptions of eligible investment types).
188. See infra Appendix A (showing that 11/33 state enterprise zone laws
include incentives that promote manufacturing or production activities).
189. See infra Appendix C (showing that only 10/33 state enterprise zone laws
require taxpayers to engage with poor communities, and of those, only seven
include incentives to specifically engage with zone residents); see also Layser,
supra note 22, at 55 (“Spatially oriented investment tax incentives are inefficient
to the extent that they encourage businesses to engage in tax-motivated behaviors
that do not correct a market failure.”).
190. See Michelle D. Layser, How Do Place-Based Investment Tax Incentives
Target Low-Income Communities? A Multi-State Survey of Enterprise Zone Tax
Incentives
(Working
Paper,
May
1,
2019),
available
at
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=3381243 (presenting a multi-state survey of
state enterprise zone laws that shows the mix of capital and labor investments
included in most state enterprise zone incentive packages).
191. See id. (“Some states mandate that to collect credits, a certain percentage
of the company’s new hires must be zone residents . . . .”); see also infra Appendix
B (showing that 19/33 state enterprise zone programs include incentives to invest
in human capital without including any specific incentive to target zone
residents).
192. See Layser, supra note 190 (“In addition to being located within the
zone's boundaries, a company may be required to create new jobs or make a
substantial capital investment within a zone.”).
193. See generally Kolko & Neumark, supra note 11; Hanson, supra note 12;
Elvery, supra note 12.
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Most of these studies have focused solely on economic indicators
like unemployment rates, poverty rates, and property values
within enterprise zones.194 Of these, job creation is most likely to
be cited as a reason for introducing spatially-oriented direct tax
incentives;195 however, the empirical support has been mixed, at
best. One study found that enterprise zones “had, at best, no effect
on employment and, at worst, a small negative effect” in some
areas, noting that “zone residents were less likely to be employed
than residents of observationally similar areas.”196
Several other studies have also noted that the effect of
enterprise zones on unemployment rates is uneven, and they have
often concluded that gains in one zone tend to be offset by losses in
another.197 For example, one study found the average effect of
enterprise zone incentives on zone employment rates to be “near
zero, evidence of variation in the effects of enterprise zones [that]
could suggest that some enterprise zones increase employment,
while others decrease it.”198 Another study concluded that
“although enterprise zone incentives affect job creation positively,
they also increase job destruction, leading to a negligible or
negative impact, on average.”199

194. See Kolko & Neumark, supra note 11, at 24 (discussing the effect of
enterprise zones on employment); see also Hanson, supra note 12, at 730
(discussing the effect of enterprise zones on property value); Elvery, supra note
12, at 57 (discussing the effect of enterprise zones on employment). One can easily
imagine other relevant metrics, such as health outcomes, crime rates, or
educational performance; however, such studies are rare in the existing
literature.
195. See Hanson, supra note 12, at 722 (“The majority of past analyses of
geographically-targeted tax incentives study programs initiated at the state l, and
focuses on how these programs affect employment outcomes.”).
196. See Elvery, supra note 12, at 57 (discussing enterprise zones in
California and Florida).
197. See Kolko & Neumark, supra note 11, at 13, 24; see also Robert T.
Greenbaum & John B. Engberg, The Impact of State Enterprise Zones on Urban
Manufacturing Establishments, 23 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 315, 315 (2004)
(discussing the positive and negative effects of enterprise zones on employment).
198. Kolko & Neumark, supra note 11, at 13, 24.
199. Greenbaum & Engberg, supra note 197, at 315; see Bondonio &
Greenbaum, supra note 11, at 133 (“The results indicate that positive
zone-induced increases in employment, sales, and capital expenditures in new
and existing establishments are offset by zone-induced losses among firms that
close or leave the zone area.”).
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Evidence about these types of tax incentives’ effect on poverty
rates is similarly mixed.200 One study observed that some
enterprise zones experienced decreased poverty rates, but overall
found no statistically significant effect on neighborhood
demographics.201 Another study found a reduction of poverty rate
in enterprise zones using some statistical models, but no effect
with others.202 These studies suggest that the effect of these tax
laws on poverty rates has also been negligible. Meanwhile little
evidence exists about other possible demographic changes in
targeted neighborhoods.
The most consistent finding with respect to spatially-oriented
direct investment tax incentives is increased property values.203
Several studies have observed that property values increase in
targeted areas.204 Though it may be impossible to know for sure
who benefits from increased property values, some researchers
have observed that it is “likely that geographically-targeted tax
incentives and grants benefit land owners,” which is more likely to
include landlords than homeowners.205 In other words, landlords
may be able to capitalize enterprise zone tax credits into rent

200. Compare Krupka & Noonan, supra note 13, at 394 (finding an increase
in the poverty rate), with Hanson, supra note 12, at 730 (finding a reduction of
poverty rate in enterprise zones using some statistical models, but no effect with
others).
201. See Deirdre Oakley & Hui-Shien Tsao, A New Way of Revitalizing
Distressed Urban Communities? Assessing the Impact of the Federal
Empowerment Zone Program, 28 J. URB. AFFS. 443, 465 (2006) (explaining the
study’s findings).
202. See Hanson, supra note 12, at 730 (explaining the results of the Busso
and Kline and HUD testing).
203. See Krupka & Noonan, supra note 13, at 394 (stating that one result of
the EZ designation is as much as a 25% increase in median home value); see also
Hanson, supra note 12, at 730 (stating that Krupka and Noonan found increased
median property value in designated areas).
204. See Krupka & Noonan, supra note 13, at 394 (stating how the MSA study
also showed an increase in property value).
205. Hanson, supra note 12, at 730; see Stephen Billings, Do Enterprise Zones
Work?: An Analysis at the Borders, 37 PUB. FIN. REV. 68, 87 (2009) (noting that
“landowners are able to capitalize these tax credits into rents”).
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increases,206 potentially to the detriment of community
residents.207
In sum, most studies of place-based investment tax incentives
to date have focused on the impact of spatially-oriented direct tax
incentives. The results of these studies have been mixed, at best,
suggesting that this type of tax incentive may be ineffective for
anti-poverty goals. The next section will identify examples of
indirect tax incentives under current law and will explain what we
know—and what we do not yet know—about their impact.
2. Indirect Tax Incentives
Spatially-oriented indirect tax incentives are the most
common form of federal place-based investment tax incentives.
The New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC) is a clear example of this
type of tax incentive.208 The NMTC is claimed by third parties who
206. See Billings, supra note 205, at 87 (explaining how the landowners can
use the tax credit to charge a high rent, so the business owners do not get the
benefit of the tax credit).
207. See DAVID CHRISTAFORE & SUSANE LEGUIZAMON, NEIGHBORHOOD
INEQUALITY
SPILLOVER
EFFECTS
OF
GENTRIFICATION
1,
https://doi.org/10.1111/pirs.12405 (explaining how rent hikes that develop
through revitalization programs can displace the poor) (on file with the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
208. See I.R.C. § 45D (2018) (explaining how the tax credit is based on the
location). Note that the federal LIHTC arguably also includes spatially-oriented
indirect tax incentives. See supra note 83 (stating the LIHTC does not directly
target low income areas, but does increase the tax credit depending on location).
In some respects, the LIHTC is not a place-based investment tax incentive as
contemplated by this typology. That is because, although the LIHTC serves to
subsidize physical structures, the law does not specify where LIHTC projects
must be located. In this regard, the LIHTC is place-neutral. However, the LIHTC
does contain two place-based components in Qualified Census Tracts and Difficult
Development Areas. See I.R.C. § 42(d)(5)(B) (2018) (stating two place-based
components are qualified census tracts and difficult development areas). Both of
these provisions define geographic areas where projects are eligible for larger tax
subsidies than projects located elsewhere. The QCT and DDA provisions increase
the profitability of projects located in high poverty areas, ostensibly to offset the
heightened risk and expense incurred by development in those areas. And since
the LIHTC is used to subsidize affordable housing projects that benefit poor
tenants, it may be tempting to classify the LIHTC as a community-oriented
indirect tax incentive; however, the LIHTC is more properly classified as a
spatially-oriented incentive for several reasons. First, there is no reason to think
that new or rehabilitated affordable housing in a QCT or DDA will benefit
community residents. To the contrary, it is reasonable to assume that such
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invest in entities that, in turn, invest in targeted places.209 In
targeting place, the NMTC adopts a spatially-oriented approach.210
Specifically, the law permits a broad range of investment types.211
The primary statutory criteria is the location of businesses and
projects within the geographic boundaries of the targeted areas.212
Although specific projects must be approved by the CDFI Fund
through a competitive application process, the statute does not
require that projects benefit the local communities or involve
community stakeholders.213 The broad definition of eligible
investments, which turns primarily on the location of the
investment, reflects a spatial-orientation.
As in the case of spatially-oriented direct tax incentives, the
empirical case for this type of tax law is relatively weak. One study
found that the NMTC causes industry sorting across location,
leading to increase investment in capital intensive industries like
manufacturing but deters investment in more labor-intensive
industries.214 Others found that the NMTC does have a positive
housing will benefit newcomers to the community, as preexisting residents
presumably already had housing. Nothing in the law requires that community
residents would have priority with respect to new or rehabilitated housing. These
lack of safeguards suggest that the QCT and DDA are better viewed as
spatially-oriented investment tax incentives. These provisions have been
critiqued as contributing to concentrated poverty and residential segregation,
potentially making conditions worse for the preexisting communities.
209. See I.R.C. § 45D (2018) (explaining how the tax credit applies when
invests in a qualified community development entity, which makes the qualified
entity investment on behalf of the taxpayer).
210. See I.R.C. §45D(e) (2018) (defining the low-income community where the
investment must be made for the tax credit).
211. See I.R.C. § 45D (2018) (stating the law permits new buildings and other
buildings).
212. See id. (explaining the definition of low-income communities and stating
the investment must be in this community to be applicable).
213. See id. (stating that there is preference to projects that help concerted
community plans, but it is not mandatory); see also Martin D. Abravanel et al.,
New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC) Program Evaluation, URB. INST. X, 67x (2016),
http://www.urban.org/research/publication/new-markets-tax-credit-nmtcprogram-evaluation (noting that “the NMTC program does not necessarily involve
local or community agencies as program participants” and that “emphasis on
producing community benefits was uneven across early-year NMTC projects”) (on
file with Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
214. See Kaitlyn Harger & Amanda Ross, Do Capital Tax Incentives Attract
New Businesses? Evidence Across Industries from the New Markets Tax Credit, 56
J. REG. SCI. 733, 734 (2016) (explaining the study).
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impact on employment but that newly created jobs tend to go to
non-residents,215 and that some of the positive neighborhood
changes are attributable to gentrification.216 To this point, it is
worth reiterating that indirect investment tax incentives like the
NMTC are capable of delivering deeper subsidies than those
associated with direct incentives. This may make them more
effective at supporting new construction and other
capital-intensive projects that can contribute to gentrification.
At least one legal scholar has reviewed the types of projects
that have been funded by the NMTC and found that it “has been
used to subsidize the development of performing arts centers for
opera, ballet, symphony orchestras, hotels, high priced
condominiums, theatres, mixed use commercial developments, and
even convention centers.”217 It is difficult to know how investments
like these impact community residents, but it is reasonable to
conclude, as the researcher did, that “such uses are not well
designed as primarily for a community and population”
experiencing the effects of concentrated poverty, and the “salient
issue is whether the people's tax dollars are used to meet the needs
of the low-income residents as earmarked by Congress.”218
The new Opportunity Zones tax law is another example of a
spatially-oriented, indirect tax incentive.219 Notwithstanding
recent comparisons of the new law with enterprise zone programs,
Opportunity Zone laws are more analogous to the NMTC. Under
the new Opportunity Zones tax law, taxpayers who sell
appreciated property can defer—or even permanently avoid—
taxes they would otherwise owe on capital gains by reinvesting the
capital gains in so-called “Opportunity Funds.”220 Opportunity
215. See Freedman, supra note 15, at 1013 (explaining how the NMTC’s
impact may not directly help the residents of the area).
216. See id. (finding that the NMTC has some positive effects on neighborhood
conditions in low-income communities but observing that the observed impacts
are attributable to changes in the composition of residents as opposed to
improvements in the welfare of existing residents).
217. Roger M. Groves, The De-Gentrification of New Markets Tax Credits, 8
FLA. TAX REV. 214, 216 (2007).
218. Id. at 231.
219. See I.R.C. § 1400Z-1 (2018) (explaining how the Opportunity Zone tax
law is based on low income communities in qualified opportunity zones).
220. See I.R.C. § 1400Z-2(a)(1)(A) (2018) (stating that treatment of gains in
gross income “shall not include so much of such gain as does not exceed the
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Funds are required to make new equity investments in businesses
located in designated low-income areas called “Opportunity
Zones.”221
The Joint Committee on Taxation has estimated that the
Opportunity Zones program will cost between $1.2 and $1.8 billion
of lost revenue per year,222 amounts that correspond to $6–9 billion
of capital flowing into Opportunity Funds (assuming a 20% capital
gains rate) each year.223 This suggests that Opportunity Zones may
help direct roughly two to three times as much capital into
low-income areas than the NMTC program, which provides for
$3.5 billion of tax credit allocations annually.224
While it is too early to assess the impact of the Opportunity
Zones law, the Opportunity Zones statute and available agency
guidance provide no reasons to expect the Opportunity Zones laws
to benefit poor communities any more effectively than the NMTC.
Instead, they include several reasons to expect the new laws to
target poor communities even less closely than the NMTC. For
example, the Opportunity Zones laws define low-income
communities by reference to the same definition in the NMTC
statute.225 As a result, Opportunity Zones are comprised of a subset
aggregate amount invested by the taxpayer in a qualified opportunity fund during
the 180-day period beginning on the date of such sale or exchange”).
221. See I.R.C. § 1400Z-2(d)(2) (2018) (defining qualified opportunity zone
property as property which is qualified opportunity zone stock, qualified
opportunity zone partnership interest, or quality opportunity zone business
property); I.R.C. § 1400Z-2(d)(1) (2018).
222. See JCX-67-17, Estimated Budget Effects of the Conference Agreement for
H.R. 1, the “Tax Cuts and Jobs Act,” JOINT COMM. TAX’N (Dec. 18, 2017),
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=5053 (estimating the
potential lost revenue stemming from the Opportunity Zones program per year
over the course of ten years) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil
Rights & Social Justice).
223. Id. at 222.
224. See I.R.C. § 45D(f)(1)(G) (2018) (identifying the new markets tax credit
limitation for 2010–2019).
225. Any population census tract if the poverty rate for such tract is at least
20 percent, or (i) in the case of a tract not located within a metropolitan area, the
median family income for such tract does not exceed 80 percent of statewide
median family income, or (ii) in the case of a tract located within a metropolitan
area, the median family income for such tract does not exceed 80 percent of the
greater of statewide median family income or the metropolitan area median
family income. I.R.C. § 45D(e) (2018) (defining low-income community under the
NMTC); see I.R.C. § 1400Z-1(c)(1) (2018) (stipulating that low-income community
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of NMTC-eligible census tracts. No further guidance is provided as
to the types of investments that should be made in Opportunity
Zones, and the law contains no downstream requirements related
to job creation or community-oriented activity.
In addition, where the NMTC program is administered jointly
with the Treasury Department’s CDFI Fund, which makes tax
credit allocations to CDEs based on a competitive allocation
process,226 the new Opportunity Funds program will rely on
self-certification by Opportunity Funds and very little ongoing
oversight.227 This is a departure from the structure of other federal
indirect incentives, which have been administered by the IRS in
coordination with nontax federal, state and local agencies.228 While
so-called “hybrid delegations” like these have not always been
successful in practice, they do help respond to an important
critique of tax expenditure laws generally, which is that the IRS is
ill-equipped to administer nontax substantive policies.229
In sum, the introduction of Opportunity Zones will provide
new opportunities for researchers to gather data about the impact
of spatially-oriented indirect investment tax incentives. As noted,
this type of incentive may be more likely to spur gentrification and
affect neighborhood demographics than spatially-oriented direct
has the same meaning in both I.R.C. §1400(Z)-1(c)(1) and §I.R.C. §45D(e)).
.
226. See CMTY. DEV. FIN. INST. FUND, INTRODUCTION TO THE NEW MARKETS TAX
CREDIT
PROGRAM
(2018),
https://www.cdfifund.gov/Documents/2018%20
Introduction
%20to%
20the%20NMTC%20Program%20-%20FINAL.PDF
(providing an overview of the administration of the NMTC program, the ability
for CDEs to apply for the program, and the nature of the competitive allocation
process) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social
Justice).
227. See Investing in Opportunity Funds, 83 Fed. Reg. 54279 (proposed Oct.
29, 2018) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1) (proposing the taxpayer be able to selfcertify as a Qualified Opportunity Fund and the Commissioner’s ability to
determine the time, form, and manner of self-certification); see also Prop. Reg.
§ 1.1400Z2(d)-1(a) (outlining how taxpayers could elect to be considered a
Qualified Opportunity Fund and the impact the election could have on the
taxpayers gains and interests under the proposed regulation).
228. As mentioned, the NMTC is administered in cooperation with the CDFI
Fund. The LIHTC is administered jointly with state and local housing authorities.
229. See David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and
Spending Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955, 1015 n.198 (2003) (using the food stamp
program and the provision of school lunches as an example of how the IRS is
ill- equipped to administer non-tax substantive policies).
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investment tax incentives. Though empirical studies have failed to
yield clear evidence that the NMTC has resulted in gentrification,
those results may be a function of program size. Given that
Opportunity Zones is a much larger program, it provides new
opportunities to study the impact of spatially-oriented indirect
investment tax incentives. In the meantime, it is reasonable to
predict that Opportunity Zones will have similar—or
exacerbated—effects as the NMTC, suggesting that the law’s
potential as an anti-poverty program is limited.
3. Community-Oriented Investment Tax Incentives
Examples of community-oriented investment tax incentives
are rare under current law. This fact alone raises both theoretical
and empirical questions to be answered by researchers. First, why
are community-oriented investment tax incentives so uncommon
under current law? What political and social conditions contribute
to the continued use of spatially-oriented investment tax
incentives—and the bipartisan support of those incentives—
despite what many would view as disappointing empirical results?
To the extent that community-oriented investment tax incentives
exist under current law, what were the political and social
conditions that made them viable, and what are the barriers to
their use by other jurisdictions?
Second, what impact do community-oriented investment tax
incentives have on neighborhoods and community residents? To
answer this question, researchers need to be able to identify
examples of community-oriented investment tax incentives in
order to deliberately study their impact. As this Section will
explain, few pure examples of community-oriented investment tax
incentives exist under current law, making it challenging for
researchers to gather the data needed to assess their impact. This
section will describe examples of community-oriented investment
tax incentives that exist under current law and pertinent studies.
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1. Direct Tax Incentives
A handful of state enterprise zone programs include at least
one community-oriented direct tax incentive.230 These tax
incentives generally exist alongside other, spatially-oriented direct
tax incentives.231 Under current law, few, if any, rules restrict
eligible investments to those most likely to benefit poor
communities.232 However, some state enterprise zone laws do
include workforce development incentives with safeguards for poor
residents.233 In addition, two state laws make taxpayer eligibility
contingent on engagement with community residents, as opposed
to the location of the firm.234 Enterprise zone tax incentives like
these are community-oriented direct investment tax incentives.
For example, enterprise zone laws in Connecticut, Florida and
Texas offer taxpayers larger incentives for hiring community
residents than most nonresidents;235 however, they also offer
230. See generally NAT’L CONFERENCE ON STATE LEGISLATURES, ENTERPRISE
ZONES:
DEVELOPMENT
FOR
DISTRESSED
COMMUNITIES
(2005),
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/econ/EntZonesDev.pdf (outlining the purposes,
incentives, and community effects of enterprise zone programs) (on file with the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
231. Michelle D. Layser, How Do Place-Based Investment Tax Incentives
Target Low-Income Communities? A Multi-State Survey of Enterprise Zone Tax
Incentives
(Working
Paper,
May
1,
2019),
available
at
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=3381243. For example, several states combine
incentives that encourage taxpayers to hire zone residents with incentives to invest
in a broad range of eligible investments that are not designed to target community
residents. See infra Appendix A, Appendix B, and Appendix C.
232. See infra Appendix A (demonstrating that even when the eligible types
of investments are narrowly defined, those laws tend to promote manufacturing
and production activities, which are not as likely to benefit low-skilled residents
as service-oriented jobs); see also Ross & Wolf, supra note 52, at 18.
233. See infra Appendix B (showing that only two out of 33 states with current
enterprise zone law include incentives that require business to hire zone
residents). See generally NAT’L CONFERENCE ON STATE LEGISLATURES, ENTERPRISE
ZONES:
DEVELOPMENT
FOR
DISTRESSED
COMMUNITIES
(2005),
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/econ/EntZonesDev.pdf (showing how different
states, like Louisiana and Illinois, only get the incentives if a certain percentage
of workers are from a specified disadvantaged group) (on file with the Washington
& Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
234. See LA. REV. STAT. § 51:1787(B)(3) (tying eligibility to hiring zone
residents, not the firm location); Tex. Gov't C. § 2303.402 (tying eligibility to
hiring zone residents, not the firm location).
235. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-217(e) (West 2019) (providing that the
group’s net income be calculated in compliance with §12-218(a), which states the
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equivalent tax benefits to firms that hire vulnerable populations of
nonresidents, such as people who are eligible for benefits under
state welfare programs, veterans, or other economically
disadvantaged persons.236 Because these laws contain specific
incentives to benefit community residents, they can be properly
categorized as community-oriented direct incentives, but their
impact may be diluted by the alternate incentives. As a result,
studies of their impact may convey limited information about the
impact of community-oriented direct investment tax incentives.
Nevertheless, at least one study of community-oriented direct
investment tax incentives in Texas provided some evidence to
suggest that the laws helped reduce poverty rates in the targeted
area.237 The Texas enterprise zone law, “creates explicit incentives
to hire from, although not necessarily create jobs in, areas
designated as EZs.”238 Texas law creates tax incentives for hiring
“combined group's net income shall be the aggregate net income or loss of each
taxable member and nontaxable member of the combined group derived from a
unitary business . . . .”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 212.096 (West 2019) (outlining the
hiring and compensation requirements needed in order for an eligible business to
qualify for the credit); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2303.402 (outlining how a business
qualifies as a qualified business and requiring that 25% of the worker live within
the zone). In addition, at least two states tie the availability of hiring tax credits
to employees’ residence within the county or municipality that contains the zones.
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 63N-2-212 (West 2019) (limiting tax incentives to business
entities for which at least 51% of the employees employed at facilities of the
business entity located in the enterprise zone are individuals who, at the time of
employment, reside in the county in which the enterprise zone is located; or an
enterprise zone that is immediately adjacent and contiguous to the county in
which the enterprise zone is located); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27H-78 (requiring that
employee be residents of the municipality in which the zone is located, or a
resident of a municipality in which another enterprise zone has been designated).
236. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-217(e) (outlining how a combined group
can qualify); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 212.096 (describing the kinds of new employees
that qualify under this section); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2303.402 (including
inmates, those unemployed for three months, and individuals with disabilities,
among others, in the definition of economically disadvantaged for the purpose of
this section).
237. See generally Matthew Freedman, Targeted Business Incentives and
Local Labor Markets, 48 J. HUM. RESOURCES 311 (2013) (outlining the program
structure of the Texas Enterprise Zone project and showing empirical evidence
that the program leads to growth in work-place employment and resident
employment).
238. Matthew Freedman, Targeted Business Incentives and Local Labor
Markets, 48 J. HUM. RESOURCES 311, 312 (2013) (focusing on one state allows the
author to isolate outcomes and achieve better results).
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community residents, veterans, or economically disadvantaged
persons.239 Those tax incentives are available to firms regardless of
whether the firm itself is located in the enterprise zone.240 A study
of the impact of these laws found that they helped increase
resident employment in high-poverty zones (near 20% poverty
rate) by 1–2 percent per year.241 This is an encouraging result for
those who hope place-based investment tax incentives may be
effective anti-poverty tools. However, more research would be
needed to confirm results like these, and one should be cautious of
making policy decisions based on a single study.
Moreover, more research would be needed to assess what
specific design feature might drive such results—the specific
incentive to hire area residents, or the widespread availability of
the incentives to firms located outside zone boundaries. Here, it is
worth noting that a California law that provided tax incentives for
firms to hire employees from “targeted employment areas” (as long
as the hiring firm was located within the zone) was repealed in
2013.242 The legislature cited findings that the program had been
unsuccessful.243 This may suggest that it is not enough to tie
incentives to hiring community residents. In short, more research
is needed to fully evaluate the impact of community-oriented direct
tax incentives.
2. Indirect Tax Incentives
Few, if any, pure community-oriented indirect investment tax
incentives exist under current law. One reason for this gap may be
that, of the factors that tend to suggest a community-oriented
approach, the feature that can be most easily incorporated into this
model would be a narrow definition of eligible investments. This
approach is rarely seen under current law.
239. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2303.402 (providing incentives for qualified
businesses to hire different groups of community residents).
240. Id. (allowing the qualified business to either reside in the state or provide
commitment to initiating conduct and business activity within the zone).
241. Freedman, supra note 238, at 312.
242. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 17053.74(b)(4) (2019) (repealed 2019).
243. See Cal. A.B. No. 93 § 1(c) (July 11, 2013) (calling for comprehensive
reform to lead to statistically significant increases in employment levels and
growth).
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Nevertheless, so-called neighborhood assistance tax credits fit
imperfectly into this model.244 For example, Pennsylvania law
provides tax credits to individuals who contribute to entities that
provide “neighborhood assistance, comprehensive service projects,
affordable housing, domestic violence or veterans' housing
assistance, job training or education for individuals, community
services or crime prevention in an impoverished area.”245 This law
subsidizes contributions to nonprofit entities, which invest in
low-income communities;246 however, one can imagine similarly
restrictive language incorporated into the design of incentives to
subsidize for-profit investment.
To date, little is known about the impact of
community-oriented indirect tax incentives. Since so few examples
exist under current law, the best chances for researchers to gather
data to evaluate their potential as anti-poverty tools may be to
work with policymakers to introduce pilot programs. More
research is needed to determine the ideal tax incentive design and
to assess implementation challenges. Until such research is
available, our understanding of the potential and limitations of
place-based investment tax incentives as anti-poverty tools will
remain incomplete.
IV. Conclusion
This Article has developed a typology that identifies four basic
types of place-based investment tax incentives, two of which are
relatively common under current law, and two that are exceedingly
rare. While it is possible that any given place-based investment tax
incentive may include a combination of features that straddle the
categories, making it more difficult to apply the typology,247 there
244. Layser, supra note 22, at 66–68 (including “financial assistance, labor,
material and technical advice to aid in the physical, economic and community
improvement” in neighborhood assistance programs through “community
services, crime prevention, economic development, education, housing, and job
training.”).
245. See 72 PA. STAT. ANN. § 8904-A(a) (West 2019) (allowing tax credits for
businesses taking part in the aforementioned activities).
246. Id. (explaining one of the effects of the law).
247. See Smith, supra note 30, at 380 (asserting that the problem of sorting
real-life cases into theoretical categories is a challenge under any typology).
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are both practical and theoretical reasons to adopt this typology
despite such challenges.
First, as this Article showed, most current laws adopt a
monolithic spatially-oriented approach, making it relatively
simple to categorize them despite the theoretical difficulty. Second,
even if multi-faceted approaches to targeting place become more
common, legal analysis is well suited to deal with this
complication. Balancing tests are prevalent in legal analysis and
can be applied here as well. To the extent that spatially-oriented
features dominate, the incentive can be categorized with other
spatially-oriented incentives, even if some community-oriented
features are present. Thus, this typology holds promise as a tool to
enable more deliberate research into how tax law design affects the
impact of place-based investment tax incentives.
Finally, the typology presented in this Article describes a
conceptual, theoretical ideal. To that end, it is immaterial whether
every place-based investment tax incentive can be easily sorted
into one category or another. Rather, one of the most important
functions of this typology is to provide benchmarks that force
lawmakers to confront the assumptions about place that are built
into these tax laws and affect their performance. In so doing, we
may finally be able to move beyond the debates about place-based
investment tax incentives and take steps to reform and expand
knowledge in this area of tax law and poverty.
Appendix A: Eligible Investments
State

Broad or
Undefined

Narrow
or
Defined

Preference for
Manufacturing
/ Production

Alabama
X
California
X
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware

X

X

X

X

X

X

Statutory
Reference
Ala. Code § 41-2324; Ala. Code
§ 41-23-26
Cal. Rev. & Tax
Code
§ 17053.73(b)(11)
Col. Rev. Stat.
§ 39-30-104(1)(a)
Conn. Gen. Stat.
§32-9l
Del. Code tit. 30
§ 2020; Del. Code
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District of
Columbia
Florida
Georgia

tit. 30 § 2010
Unspecified

X
X
X

Hawaii
Illinois

X
X

Indiana
Louisiana
Maryland

X
X

X

X

Michigan
Minnesota

X

X
X

Missouri
X
Montana
Nevada
New
Hampshire
New Jersey

X
X
X

North
Carolina
North
Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma

X

X

New
Mexico
New York

X

X
X
X
X
X

X

X

X

Unspecified
Ga. Code Ann.,
§ 36-88-3(2 and
8), and Ga. Code
Ann., § 36-88-4(ac).
Haw. Rev. Stat.
§ 209E-2.
35 Ill. Comp.
Stat. 20 § 5/201(f)
Ind. Code § 6-3-310
La. Rev. Stat.
§ 51:1787(B)(3)
Md. Code Econ.
Dev. § 9-103
Mich. Comp. L.
§ 207.777
Minn. Stat.
§ 469.1732
Mo. Rev. Stat. tit.
X § 135.230; Mo.
Rev. Stat. tit. X
§ 135.100
Mont. Code Ann.
§ 7-21-3710
Nev. Rev. Stat.
tit. 22 § 274.270
N.H. Rev. Stat.
12 § 162-N:6
N.J. Stat.
§ 52:27H-74; N.J.
Stat. § 52:27H-62
N.M. Stat. § 7-218.4; N.M. Stat.
§ 7-2-15
N.Y. Tax L. § 210B (repealed)
N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 105-129.83
N.D. Cent. Code
§ 40-63-04
Ohio. Rev. Code
§§§ 5709.631
Okla. Stat. 5A
§ 690.4;
Okla. Stat. 68
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Oregon
Pennsylvan
ia
Rhode
Island
Tennessee
Texas

X

X

X
X
X
X

Utah
X

Wisconsin

X

X

§ 2357.4
Or. Rev. Stat 26A
§ 285C.135
72 Pa. Stat.
§ 8904-A
Unspecified
Unspecified
Tex. Gov't C.
§ 2303.404; Tex.
Gov't C.
§ 2303.405
Utah Code § 63N2-213; Utah Code
§ 63N-2-302;
Utah Admin. C.
R357-15-4; Utah
Admin. C. R35715-4
Wis. Stat.
§ 238.399(5m)

Appendix B: Incentives to Invest in Human Capital or
Affordable Housing
State

Alabama

Incentives
Do Not
Target
Zone
Residents

Incentives
Target
Zone
Residents
(Non
Exclusive)

X

California
X
Colorado
X
Connecticut
Delaware

X
X

Incentives
Target
Zone
Residents
(Exclusive)

Statutory
Reference

Ala. Code § 4123-24(a)(1)
Cal. Rev. &
Tax. Code
§ 17053.73(b)(1
0)(A)
C.R.S. § 39-30105.1(1)(a)(I);
C.R.S. § 39-30105.1(6)(c)
Conn. Gen.
Stat. § 12217(e)
Del. Code tit.
30 § 2020; Del.
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District of
Columbia
Florida

X
X

Georgia
X
Hawaii

X

Illinois
Indiana

X

Louisiana
Maryland

X
X

Michigan
Minnesota

X
X

Missouri
X
Montana

X

Nevada
New
Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North
Carolina
North

X
X
X

X
X
X

Code tit. 30
§ 2011
D.C. Code § 2219.01-219.05.
Fla. Stat. tit.
XIX § 212.096;
F.S.A.
§ 220.03(q)
Ga. Code Ann.,
§ 36-88-3(2, 68), and Ga.
Code Ann.,
§ 36-88-4(a-c).
Haw. Rev.
Stat. § 209E9(3).
None
Ind. Code § 63-3-10
La. Rev. Stat.
§ 51:1787(A)(2)
Md. Code
Econ. Dev.
§ 10-702
Mich. Comp. L.
§ 207.777
Minn. Stat.
§ 469.171
Mo. Rev. Stat.
tit. X
§ 135.110; Mo.
Rev. Stat. tit. X
§ 135.230
Mont. Code
Ann. § 7-213710
Nev. Rev. Stat.
tit. 22
§ 274.270
N.H. Rev. Stat.
12 § 162-N:6
N.J. Stat.
§ 52:27H-76
None
N.Y. Tax L.
§ 210-C
(repealed)
N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 105-129.83
N.D. Cent.
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Dakota
Ohio
X

Oklahoma
X
Oregon

X

Pennsylvania

X

Rhode Island
X
Tennessee

X

Texas

X

Utah

X

Wisconsin

X

Code § 40-6304
Ohio. Rev.
Code
§§§ 5709.64;
Ohio. Rev.
Code
§§§ 5709.65
Okla. Stat. 5A
§ 690.4; Okla.
Stat. 68
§ 2357.4
Or. Rev. Stat
26A
§ 285C.135
72 Pa. Stat.
§ 8904-A
R.I. Gen. L.
1956 § 42-64.36
Tenn. Code
§ 13-28-208
Tex. Gov't C.
§ 2303.402
Utah Code
§ 63N-2-213(7)
Wis. Stat.
§ 71.07(3w)

Appendix C: Taxpayer Eligibility
State

Taxpayer’
s
Business
or
Property
Must be
Located
in the
Zone

Taxpayer
Must
Engage with
Poor
Communitie
s (Does Not
Targets
Zone
Residents)

Alabama
X
California
X
Colorado

X

X

Taxpayer
Must
Engage with
Poor
Communitie
s (Targets
Zone
Residents)

Statutory
Reference

Ala. Code § 41-2324; Ala. Code § 4123-26
Cal. Rev. & Tax.
Code
§ 17053.73(b)(11)(A
); Cal. Rev. & Tax.
Code § 23626
C.R.S. § 39-30-104
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Connecticut
Delaware
District of
Columbia
Florida

X

X

X
X

X

X

Georgia
X
Hawaii
Illinois
Indiana

X
X
X

Louisiana
Maryland
Michigan
Minnesota

X

X
X

X
X

X

X

Missouri
X
Montana
Nevada
New
Hampshire
New Jersey

X
X
X
X

X

(investments);
C.R.S. § 39-30103.5
(contribution);
C.R.S. § 39-30105.1(1)(a)(I)
(hiring tax credits).
Conn. Gen. Stat.
§ 12-217(e)
Del. Code tit. 30
§ 2020; Del. Code
tit. 30 § 2010
D.C. Code § 61504; DC ST
§ 2-219.01
Fla. Stat. tit. XIX
§ 212.096
Ga. Code Ann.,
§ 36-88-3(2 and 8),
and Ga. Code Ann.,
§ 36-88-4(a-c).
Haw. Rev. Stat.
§ 209E-9
35 Ill. Comp. Stat.
20 § 5/201(f)
Ind. Code § 6-3-310
La. Rev. Stat.
§ 51:1787(B)(3)
Md. Code Econ.
Dev. § 5-707
Mich. Comp. L.
§ 207.777; Mich.
Comp. L. § 207.773
Minn. Stat.
§ 469.171
Mo. Rev. Stat. tit.
X § 135.230; Mo.
Rev. Stat. tit. X
§ 135.240
Mont. Code Ann.
§ 7-21-3710
Nev. Rev. Stat. tit.
22 § 274.260
N.H. Rev. Stat. 12
§ 162-N:2
N.J. Stat.
§ 52:27H-74; N.J.
Stat. § 52:27H-62;
N.J. Stat.
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New
Mexico
New York
North
Carolina
North
Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania

Rhode
Island
Tennessee

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

Texas

X

Utah
X
Wisconsin

X

X

§ 52:27H-76.
N.M. Stat. § 7-218.4; N.M. Stat.
§ 7-2-15
N.Y. Code Rules &
Reg. § 11.1
N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 105-129.83
N.D. Cent. Code
§ 40-63-04
Ohio. Rev. Code
§§§ 5709.61; Ohio.
Rev. Code
§§§ 5709.64
Okla. Stat. 5A
§ 690.4
Or. Rev. Stat 26A
§ 285C.135; Or.
Rev. Stat 26A
§ 285C.200
72 Pa. Stat. § 8904A
R.I. Gen. L. 1956
§ 42-64.3-3
Tenn. Code § 1328-208
Tex. Gov't C.
§ 2303.402
Utah Code § 63N2-213; Utah Code
§ 63N-2-215; Utah
Admin. C. R35715-5
Wis. Stat.
§ 238.399

